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ABSTRACT 
 
 Historically, the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) and Myanmar’s Armed 
Forces (Tatmadaw) held tremendous levels of domestic political influence. Following 
independence in the 1940s, both countries experienced a short and unstable democratic 
period. Largely due to the weakness of civilian institutions, and the special place of the TNI 
and the Tatmadaw in society, both militaries became the most dominant political actors in 
their respective countries. In 1998, President Suharto’s government fell, which instigated a 
period of political reform whereby the TNI removed itself from the political realm. It would 
seem as if democratisation has seen the TNI lose significant political clout. However, is it this 
simple? Does democratisation mean a total loss of political influence for the military?  
 This paper seeks to understand to what extent the TNI lost political influence in the 
democratic era and whether similar developments are likely for Myanmar’s Tatmadaw. To 
answer this question, this paper will review literature on influence, democracy and civil-
military relations in order to produce a thematic framework of indicators that can be used for 
further analysis on the TNI and the Tatmadaw. Once a framework has been laid, this paper 
will investigate the Indonesian experience, focusing on pre-democracy (1945-1998), before 
shifting to see how influential the TNI is in the democratic era (1998-2015). The Tatmadaw’s 
political influence will then be examined in the junta period (1948-2015). Once the Tatmadaw 
current state is understood, this paper will provide informed judgements on the likely 
influence of the Tatmadaw in a future democratic Myanmar.  
This paper found that in the post-Suharto era, the TNI still retains political influence 
as a result of its strong standing in Indonesian society, involvement in off-budget income 
generation, and a strong internal security role, as well as weak civilian institutions. Although 
the TNI no longer have a dominant role in Indonesia politics, they certain hold a level of 
political influence in Jakarta. With Myanmar heading toward democratisation, after fifty years 
of junta rule, will the Tatmadaw follow a similar trajectory? This paper is timely. November 8, 
2015 will see democratic elections take place in Myanmar. The most popular political party, 
the National League for Democracy, led by democratic icon Aung San Suu Kyi, is likely to do 
very well in the election. At the same time, Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution indirectly bans her 
from becoming president,  provides the Tatmadaw with 25 percent of the seats in parliament 
and gives the military a veto option, even in the supposedly democratic era.  
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GLOSSARY 
 
ACRONYMS AND FOREIGN WORDS 
 
AFC     Asian Financial Crisis 
AFPFL     Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (Myanmar) 
Amyotha Hluttaw   Upper House of Myanmar’s Parliament  
ASEAN    Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
ASSK     Aung San Suu Kyi 
BIA Burmese Independence Army  
BRIMOB Korps Brigade Mobil, Police Paramilitary Unit 
BSPP     Burma Socialist Program Party  
CIMIC     Civil Military Cooperation  
CMR     Civil Military Relations 
Detasemen Khusus 88  Detachment 88, Police Counterterrorism Unit  
GAM     Gerakan Aceh Merdeka 
Free Aceh Movement 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GOLKAR Partai Golongan Karya  
The Party of the Functional Groups 
IPAC Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict 
KNIL Koninklijk Nederlands-Indische Leger 
The Royal Dutch East Indies Army 
KOSTRAD Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat 
 Indonesian Army Reserve Strategic Command  
KPK     Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi 
     Corruption Eradication Commission (Indonesia)  
MOOTW    Military Operations Other Than War  
MPR     Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia 
     People’s Consultative Assembly (Indonesia) 
NATO     North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NLD National League for Democracy (Myanmar) 
PKI     Indonesian Communist Party  
POLRI Kepolisian Negra Republik Indonesia 
Indonesian National Police  
Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Myanmar’s Parliament, both Upper and Lower Houses 
Pyithu Hluttaw    Lower House of Myanmar’s Parliament  
Reformasi    Indonesian Political Reform Period (From 1998) 
Sangha    Buddhist Monastic Order in Myanmar  
SBY     Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono  
SLORC    State Law and Order Restoration Council  
SPDC     State Peace and Development Council  
Tatmadaw    Myanmar Armed Forces  
Tentara Nasional Indonesia   Tentara Nasional Indonesia 
Indonesian National Armed Forces   
US     United States of America 
USD     United States Dollar  
USDP     Union Solidarity and Development Party 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 When an authoritarian regime decides to hand power to the people through free and 
fair democratic elections, one could assume that the military would remove itself from the 
political arena. One could also assume that the military, once the most politically influential 
force in many Southeast Asian countries, would act at the behest of a democratically elected 
government; not against the government but for it. This dissertation seeks to understand to 
what extent the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI)1 lost political influence in the 
democratic era and whether similar developments are likely for Myanmar’s Armed Forces 
(Tatmadaw). This paper does not assume that Indonesia and Myanmar are directly 
comparable. However, there are some very bold similarities between the two Southeast 
Asian nations, especially with regards to the place of the armed forces in society.  
This paper will be made up of three chapters. Chapter one will focus on the theories of 
political influence, democracy and civil-military relations in order to produce a framework for 
further analysis of the TNI and the Tatmadaw.  Chapter Two will analyse the TNI’s political 
role in both the pre-democratic and democratic eras in order to establish the extent to which 
the TNI lost political influence after 1998, when President Suharto stood down. Chapter 
Three will analyse the Tatmadaw’s political dominance from independence in 1948 until 
immediately prior to the November 2015 elections. The Second Section of Chapter Three 
will provide informed judgements about how this issue is likely to develop over the coming 
years. These informed judgements, referred to as assessments, are required because 
Myanmar is yet to fully realise democracy. Without such assessments it is impossible to 
answer the question.  
 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 This paper seeks to answer the following question: to what extent has the TNI lost 
political influence in the democratic era and are similar developments likely for Myanmar’s 
Tatmadaw? This question has two main parts. The first part focuses on understanding 
Indonesian civil-military relations. There is a requirement to compare the political influence 
that the TNI had before democracy and after Suharto stood down in 1998. This comparison 
will answer the first part of the question. The second part requires an understanding of the 
Burmese experience to lay the foundations of the issue before making judgements on 
plausible futures of the Tatmadaw and democracy in Myanmar. 
                                                             
1 The Indonesian military has been renamed several times since it was founded during the Revolution. This 
paper will refer to the Indonesian military as the TNI, the acronym derived from its full name: Tentara Nasional 
Indonesia (TNI; Indonesian National Armed Forces). 
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 This study is based on qualitative analysis of available primary and secondary 
sources, the findings from which will form the foundation of the argument. Findings from 
these sources produce the argument. This paper employs an analytical method referred to 
as the cone of plausibility to help produce informed judgements about Myanmar’s future. The 
cone of plausibility, as well as the significant limits of using any futurist analytical method, will 
be described in the Myanmar chapter.  
Sources were selected with the assistance of contacts in Southeast Asia as well as 
specialists in New Zealand and Australia.  Due to the large selection of available primary and 
secondary sources, it was felt early on in the research phase that interviews were not 
required as part of the gathering of research material. However, during field research 
excursions to Singapore, Indonesia and Myanmar discussions were had with government 
officials, analysts, academics, defence attachés, economists and ambassadors. These semi-
formal discussions have supplemented the primary and secondary source analysis. Findings 
from these discussions were further investigated in the literature, and subsequently referred 
without linking the idea to the respective meeting. As such, the content of these discussions 
remains confidential. The field research excursions were funded through a New Zealand 
Prime Minister’s Scholarship for Asia. The field research excursions took place over the 
following dates in 2015; Singapore 10-24 January, Indonesia 16 May-3 June, and Myanmar 
3 June–14 June. Travel has allowed a much richer appreciation of Southeast Asian cultures 
and local attitudes toward armed forces in society.  
There are serious barriers with studying Indonesia and Myanmar, including the 
limiting effect of different languages and the cultural complexities of both countries. To 
comprehend this, significant background reading was required. Discussions were had with 
both Burmese and Indonesians on their views of the topic. This enabled a better 
appreciation of predispositions that affected earlier understandings of the topics. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THEORY 
 
This chapter will explore existing literature on the military’s political influence before 
and after democratic transition, focusing on Southeast Asia. Much of the theory on the 
military’s political influence is found within the body of literature known as civil-military 
relations (CMR). Therefore, this chapter will examine CMR, highlighting themes that assist in 
analysing and describing the political influence of the military. This chapter will explore both 
classical and recent theory before focusing on Southeast Asian approaches. The chapter will 
conclude with the provision of a thematic framework of indicators derived from the theory 
that illustrates the political influence of the military in Southeast Asia. In later chapters, this 
framework will be used as a tool to investigate the TNI’s overall political influence before and 
after democratic transition in Indonesia and the contemporary political influence of 
Myanmar’s Tatmadaw. Assessments made on the future of Myanmar’s CMR will also use 
this framework. For the purposes of this paper, it is crucial to understand the meaning of two 
key concepts: political influence and democracy. 
 
WHAT IS POLITICAL INFLUENCE?  
Influence is a concept that is easy to define but difficult to measure. The simplest way 
to describe influence is the most direct, it is “the ability to get others to act as you intend.”2 
However, influence can also be indirect and create unintended second and third order 
effects. Therefore, influence is having a positive, negative, neutral, intentional or 
unintentional effect on something be it people, governments, markets, politics, war or 
academia. This paper is primarily concerned with the influence of the military as it pertains to 
politics. For the purposes of this paper, influence will be defined as the ability to bring about 
the political ends one desires through both attractive and coercive means. 
There are many ways militaries and military officers can influence domestic politics 
other than the coercive use of force. This can include lobbying civilian politicians, shaping 
public opinion and participating in civil society organisations or think tanks.3  However, 
military organisations have the added ability to use physical violence to conduct coercive 
actions against a civilian population or against governments. Coercive force is rarely 
considered an appropriate or legitimate method of domestic influence. Coercion, regardless 
of its illegitimacy, remains one form of political influence available to the military. The fact is 
that the military is the national instrument charged with conducting organised violence in 
defence of the state. As the law of the instrument notes “if the only tool you have is a 
                                                             
2 Edward C. Banfield, Political Influence (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2003), xxii. 
3
 Marcus Mietzner, Military Politics, Islam, and the State of Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic 
Consolidation (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), 8.  
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hammer, you tend to treat everything as a nail.”4 As such, the military may have a 
predisposition toward the use of force as an influencing tool.  
 
WHAT IS DEMOCRACY? 
Democracy is an emotive word which means many different things to many different 
people. Joseph Schumpeter argued that the definition of democracy had been made into a 
utopian or idealistic idea.5  Schumpeter was referring to the point that theory on democracy 
at that time (1940s) defined democracy using its supposed source (the will of the people) 
and its idealised purpose (the common good).6 Schumpeter argued that there was “another 
theory of democracy.”7 “The democratic method […]” Schumpeter argued, “[…] is that 
institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the 
power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”8 This paper will 
follow Schumpeter’s argument by using a definition of democracy coined by Samuel P. 
Huntington. Huntington’s definition regarded a “[…] political system as democratic to the 
extent that it’s most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest 
and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all 
of the adult population is eligible to vote.”9  
As well as free and fair elections, democracy has other connotations. Democratic 
societies often pride themselves on human rights, including the right to peaceful protest, free 
speech and the right to a fair legal trial, as well as others. Empirical research has concluded 
that there is a positive relationship between democracy and human rights.10  Scholars found 
that not only was there a positive relationship between the two concepts, but human rights 
actually underpinned democracy itself.11 Without a baseline of human rights, democracy can 
not effectively function.   
Democratisation is the process in which a country becomes democratic as opposed 
to another system of governance. The country could have been an authoritarian regime, 
meaning that the vast majority of the people could not vote for their political leadership. 
Democratisation is not a simple process for a country to advance through. Many Western 
states took hundreds of years to advance along the democratic spectrum before becoming 
                                                             
4 Abraham H. Maslow, Psychology of Science: A Reconnaissance (Oxford: Gateway Editions, 1966). 
5 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University 
of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 6. 
6 Ibid.  
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Kirsten Haack, The United Nations Democracy Agenda: A Conceptual History (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2011), 61. 
11
 Ibid. 
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consolidated democracies. As a democratic country evolves, it advances from democratic 
transition into a phase of democracy called ‘consolidation.’ Once a transitional democracy 
becomes a consolidated democracy, it is unlikely it will revert to authoritarianism.12 
Examples of countries that can be regarded as consolidated democracies include the United 
Kingdom, India and France.13 Though Mexico and South Africa are accepted as examples of 
transitional democracies, they are not seen to be consolidated democracies.14 While a 
country is in its democratic transition, the military may remain a strong political actor due to 
the weakness of the civilian institutions.15 To function effectively as a democracy the country 
requires a reasonable standard of security in order to facilitate a peaceful transfer of power 
through an electoral system. It is widely accepted that for a democracy to flourish, the 
military must accept that it is subordinate and subservient to the democratically elected 
government.16  It is possible for a transitional democracy to revert back to an authoritarian 
regime; examples include Iran in 1953 and more recently Fiji in 2006.17 In both cases the 
democratically elected government was overthrown by elements of the military through 
successful coups. This illustrates how influential the military typically is in any transitional 
democracy, which is an issue at the nexus of CMR.  
 
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS  
 
“War is too important a matter to be left to the military.”18  
Georges Clemenceau 
 
“Peace is too important to be left in the hands of civilians.”19  
Admiral Thomas B. Hayward 
 
CMR is a field of study that covers not only the relationship between the armed 
forces and the state, but also its relationship with the wider political scene and civil society.20 
                                                             
12 Gerard Alexander, The Sources of Democratic Consolidation (Ithaca: Cornell University, 2002), 59. 
13 Mark Kesselman, Joel Krieger and William A. Joseph, Introduction to Comparative Politics: Brief Edition 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2009), 39, 99 and 153. 
14 Ibid.,  263 and 313. 
15 Muthiah Alagappa, Coercion and Governance: The Declining Role of the Military in Asia (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2001), 452. 
16 Kesselman, Krieger and. Joseph, Introduction to Comparative Politics: Brief Edition, 21. 
17 Ironically it was a democratic country, the US, that assisted the Iranian Shah to overthrow the democratically 
elected government in Tehran; Andrew Scott Cooper, The Oil Kings: How the U.S., Iran, and Saudi Arabia 
Changed the Balance of Power in the Middle East (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011), 22-23. 
18 Bong Lee, The Unfinished War: Korea, (New York: Algora Publishing, 2013), 92. 
19
 General A.S. Collins, Jr, USA (Ret.), “…On Land,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May (1979): 33. 
20
 Alagappa, Coercion and Governance: The Declining Role of the Military in Asia, 4. 
13 
 
 
CMR includes the national level interface between the military and various branches of 
government. CMR does not include the operational relationship between the military and civil 
agencies, like police, intelligence or disaster-relief, which is referred to as civil-military affairs 
or civil-military cooperation (CIMIC).21 As countries have different political systems, ranging 
from democratic to totalitarian, it is difficult to apply a single model of CMR across all 
societies. 
The predominant discussion of CMR includes some normative bias with regards to 
preference toward civilian control of armed forces, as opposed to military dominance of 
politics.22 For the purpose of this paper it is useful to deconstruct this bias as it can be 
misleading. For instance, the bias toward civilian control assumes the word ‘military’ has a 
similar connotation across countries; which is not the case. Militaries around the world hold 
different perceptions of their place in society. Some militaries brand themselves as defence 
forces.23 Other militaries describe themselves as armed forces and others see themselves 
as belonging to the people or a monarch.24 Some militaries were established centuries ago 
and have become what is referred to now as professional armed forces.25 Other militaries 
are much younger, evolving from militia groups or established in an ad hoc manner during 
anti-colonial or revolutionary periods.26 Other groups who view themselves as a military force 
may not even officially represent an internationally recognised country; such as the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army, the Kachin Independence Army, and the People’s 
Defence Force of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party.  
 
CLASSICAL THEORY ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS  
Much of the literature on CMR discusses mechanisms to deal with the subject’s 
predominant assumption; that it is preferable to have civilian control of the military. This 
clash is an age old challenge to the governance of human societies and is an issue that 
many have struggled with. Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz argued long ago that the 
military was a subordinate function of the state. Sun Tzu argued that: “normally, when the 
                                                             
21
 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Allied Joint Publication 9: NATO Civil-Military Cooperation 
Doctrine (Brussels: NATO, 2003), 1-1. 
22 Huntington, Janowitz, Clausewitz and Sun Tzu are all examples of this.  
23 For example, Israel, Australia, Ireland, South Africa and Timor-Leste all refer to their respective militaries as 
defence forces. Japan goes a step further in emphasising its military’s defensive nature with the Japanese Self-
Defense Force.   
24 Examples of countries who brand their militaries as armed forces include Brazil, Indonesia, Spain and Sri 
Lanka. Vietnam, China, Laos, Algeria, North Korea and South Sudan all use the word ‘people’ in the title of their 
respective militaries. Tonga and the United Kingdom’s armed forces use the word majesty in the official name. 
For comprehensive analysis on the world’s militaries, including their official names, see the latest Military 
Balance, published annually by the International Institute of Strategic Studies.  
25 For example, Her Majesty’s Armed Forces of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.  
26
 For example, the People’s Liberation Army in China, the Indonesian National Armed Forces, the Timor-Leste 
Defence Force  
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army is employed, the general first receives his commands from the sovereign.”27 Clausewitz 
noted that: “war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other 
means.”28 On government oversight of military activities Clausewitz noted “…the assertion 
that a major military development, or plan for one, should be a matter for purely military 
opinion is unacceptable and can be damaging.”29 In this piece, Clausewitz was explaining 
the necessity of separating the soldier from politics and the equally important point that 
politicians require an understanding of military matters. This was Clausewitz’s theoretical 
method of limiting the political influence of the military by decreasing its participation in the 
political arena. Thus when military personnel are involved in the administration of a political 
system, the armed forces likely have an increased ability to influence politics. 
 
RECENT THEORY ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS  
Samuel P. Huntington’s Soldier and the State, published in 1957, argues that the 
most productive way of dealing with the civil-military conflict is to exert “[…] objective civilian 
control […]” over the armed forces by professionalising them.30 Huntington’s theory argues 
that there should be a clear delineation of responsibility between the military officer and the 
politician.31 It was Huntington’s view that politicians should not get actively involved in 
military matters and military officers should not get involved in political concerns.32 
Huntington argues that in the United States of America (US), military officers are endowed, 
through specialist education in the management of violence.”33 Huntington argues that these 
so-called professional officers have a “calling to serve the public interest.”34 Writing in the 
early 1970’s, Bengt Abrahamsson noted that for Huntington, professionalism also meant that 
the military had to be politically neutral.35 In simple terms, Huntington argues that a military is 
only professional when it serves the public interest; in contrast to other militaries that serve 
                                                             
27
 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (London: Duncan Baird Publishers, 2005), 155. 
28 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 605. 
29 Ibid., 607-608. 
30 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1959) quoted in James Burk, “Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations,” Armed 
Forces & Society, Vol. 29, No.1 Fall 2002, 9. 
31 Ibid.  
32 Christopher P. Gibson, Securing the State: Reforming the National Security Decision-Making Process at the 
Civil-Military Nexus (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2008), 73. 
33 Susan M. Browne “War-Making and U.S. State Formation: Mobilization, Demobilization, and the Inherent 
Ambiguities of Federalism” in Irregular Armed Forces and their Role in Politics and State Formation, eds.  Diane 
E. Davis and Anthony W. Pereira (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 233. 
34 Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1959), 9. 
35 Bengt Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization and Political Power (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 
1972), 159;  quoted in Thomas C. Bruneau “Impediments to Conceptualizing Civil-Military Relations.” quoted in 
The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, eds. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei (New 
York: Routledge, 2013), 16. 
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themselves or the interest of their masters. Thus, Huntington’s argument assumes that a 
military can only be professional when it serves a democratically elected government which 
would allow the people’s interests to dictate the conduct of the military, through their elected 
leadership. By making the military subservient to the democratically elected government, the 
political influence of the military is directly limited. This shows how civil control of the military 
is “intricately” linked to democratic rule.36 As such, understanding the constitutional civil-
military dynamic of a country is of vital importance to understanding the political influence of 
a military in any country. Huntington’s thesis is still viewed by many as one of the most 
important pieces of work on CMR of late.37 
 In 1960, Morris Jonowitz published Professional Soldier, another seminal piece of 
CMR literature.38 Jonowitz’s argument follows on from Huntington’s in that it also focuses on 
professionalism within the officer corps as the most appropriate way of providing oversight of 
the armed forces. The argument provides another solution to the inherent issue of CMR; the 
management of power vested in the armed forces and ensuring that power is not abused. 
Under Jonowitz’s model, which blurred civilian and military responsibilities, civilian leaders 
would be required to become familiar with military thinking.39 This would allow civilians to 
make informed decisions about national security matters without relying solely on military 
commanders. This would in turn limit the political influence of the military overall. Military 
leaders, in Jonowitz’s argument, would be required to contribute to military matters in the 
political sphere which is similar to the way Clausewitz discussed his thoughts about civilians 
being included in the military decision-making process.40 Janowitz’s argument embraced 
civilian participation in military matters, including participation of citizen-soldiers in national 
defence. This chain of thought argues that “when citizens serve as soldiers to defend the 
republic, the interests of the military and the interest of the state overlap, and there is less 
need to fear a military challenge to the Republic.”41 This is a popular approach to CMR 
thinking in the developing world where many militaries were established by the ‘people’ 
during revolutionary or anti-colonial times, including in Indonesia and Myanmar. These 
                                                             
36 Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn and Phillip Lorenz, Palgrave Macmillan Democratization and Civilian Control in 
Asia (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
37 Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2003), 7; quoted in Thomas C. Bruneau, “Impediments to Conceptualizing Civil-Military 
Relations.” in The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, eds. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana 
Matei (New York: Routledge, 2013), 16. 
38 Morris Jonowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: The Free Press, 1971).  
39 Gibson, Securing the State: Reforming the National Security Decision-Making Process at the Civil-Military 
Nexus, 73. 
40 Ibid.; Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1976), 607-608. 
41
 Burk, “Theories of Democratic CMR.”11. 
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militaries often view themselves as guardians of the state and of the people. Thus, it is 
essential to understand the historical context of a nation’s civil-military dynamic. 
 
SOUTHEAST ASIAN APPROACHES TO CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
The theories presented by Huntington and Janowitz are naturally products of their 
Western origin. As such, they are useful but not entirely appropriate when analysing 
Southeast Asian CMR. This section will focus on exploring specifically Southeast Asian CMR 
literature in order to understand key themes and trends that assist in grasping the decline 
and growth of the military’s political influence in Southeast Asia. This section will explore two 
significant edited volumes on Asian CMR; Muthiah Alagappa’s Coercion and Governance 
and Marcus Mietzner’s Political Resurgence of the Military in Southeast Asia.42 These two 
edited volumes sufficiently represent the literature on Southeast Asian CMR as they both 
include chapters on Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam 
from highly-regarded scholars.43 Alagappa also includes a chapter on Malaysia and 
Mietzner’s volume incorporates a chapter on Timor-Leste.  
Alagappa and Mietzner have competing arguments about the trends of Southeast 
Asian CMR and have different approaches in explaining the indicators that illustrate the 
political influence of the military. Alagappa focuses on the use of coercion by a military, 
which he argues increases the political influence of the armed forces, albeit in an illegitimate 
way.44 Mietzner argues that the most important way militaries can gain influence is by 
becoming involved in the political institutions of the state, when civilian authorities are 
weak.45 Alagappa notes that in 1950 civilian supremacy over the military was the dominant 
model of Asian CMR.46 Conversely, from 1958, through the 1960s and 1970s, militaries in 
much of Asia became the dominant political actor.47 Alagappa argues that since 1986 the 
political influence of the military has been in decline, hence the full title of his book; Coercion 
and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia.48 Writing a decade later, 
Mietzner argues that the current trend is a Political Resurgence of the Military in Southeast 
Asia, also the title of his edited volume. 
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Alagappa and Mietzner agree that the weakness of civilian institutions provides an 
opportunity for the military to increase its political influence.49 Conversantly, strong civilian 
systems limit the political influence of the military.50 Alagappa argues that the weakness of 
civilian government institutions allows the military to fill the political void and gain influence.51 
Discussing the military’s political rise from 1958, Alagappa notes that many newly formed 
democratic states could not “…cope with the political, social, and economic mobilization and 
demands unleashed by independence and a democratic system of government.”52 The 
central argument of Mietzner’s book is that failures of civilian governments provide entry 
points for military intervention into politics, whereby stable civilian polities are able to keep 
the armed forces at bay.53 For Mietzner, the most important way militaries can gain influence 
is by becoming involved in political institutions of the state.54 Although it may seem obvious 
that when a military is directly involved in the political institutions of the state it is politically 
influential, this point is nonetheless important to note. This is one of the most important 
variables to understand in the CMR of any Southeast Asian nation, especially during the 
early phases of democratic transition when the civilian institutions are new.  
Alagappa makes the point that the military will likely assume a greater interest in the 
corporate world if its governance role is expanded, which subsequently expands the political 
influence of the military further.55 This occurred in Indonesia after 1958, and Myanmar after 
1962.56 Mietzner agrees that economic involvement is an important method for the military to 
gain political influence. By becoming involved with the economy the military can limit the 
influence of civilian institutions by raising off-budget funds giving the military more autonomy 
from the civilian government.57 It is generally accepted that economic activity by the armed 
forces undermines key principles of democratic CMR, as it allows the military to plan 
independent operations funded out of its unofficial budget and thus bypass the state’s 
civilian control.58 This would decrease the influence any government would have over the 
military and increase the military’s autonomy.  
Central to Alagappa’s overall argument is the concept of coercion.59 Alagappa argues 
that coercion and political legitimacy are negatively correlated; “the prominence of coercion 
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in securing loyalty and obedience from citizens of the state is a direct reflection of the 
weakness of the political legitimacy of the nation-state and the government.”60 Simply put, a 
nation-state that relies on coercion to govern will remain ‘politically illegitimate’ in the eyes of 
its citizenry. What does this mean for Asian countries with significant domestic security 
concerns, such as the Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia and Myanmar? 
Alagappa’s argument notes that there is a direct correlation between a country’s use of 
military force for internal security and that military’s overall political power and influence.61 
Therefore, countries that employ their respective militaries to quell internal security threats 
have politically influential militaries; countries that do this use coercion to govern. These 
governments, Alagappa argues, lack domestic political legitimacy as a direct result of their 
coercive behaviour interfering in political affairs.62 If the premise of democratic CMR is to 
have a non-politically orientated military, one could conclude that it is inherently 
undemocratic to have the military significantly involved in domestic security. Therefore, 
Alagappa’s argument that there is a correlation between a country’s use of military force for 
internal security and that military’s overall political influence has real consequences.63 If a 
military is seriously involved in internal security in a democratic country, its democratic CMR 
are likely strained.  
 
CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER ONE 
This chapter has explored existing literature relevant to the military’s political 
influence before and after democratic transition, focusing on Southeast Asia. Political 
influence was defined as the ability to get others to act as one intends in the political realm 
through both passive and coercive means. Democracy was defined as the process of 
electing the leadership of a state through free and fair elections. The assessment of 
democratisation found that the military will likely remain a strong political actor during 
transition due to the weakness of civilian institutions. However, for democracy to flourish the 
military must accept civilian supremacy.64 Much of the literature on CMR discusses 
mechanisms to deal with the subject’s inherent assumption; that it is preferable to have civil 
control of the armed forces. Where Alagappa focuses on coercion, Mietzner highlights the 
weakness of civilian institutions as the most important method for a military to gain political 
influence in Southeast Asia. When the military is economically engaged, it can limit the 
influence of civilian institutions by raising off-budget funds making the military more 
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autonomous from the civilian government. The culminating argument of both volumes is that 
the weakness of civilian institutions provides the opportunity for the military to increase its 
political influence.65 Therefore, Southeast Asian countries with weak civilian institutions will 
likely have strong politically orientated militaries, both before and after democratic transition. 
For a Southeast Asian democracy to consolidate, the civilian institutions of the state must be 
strengthened forcing the military’s political influence to dwindle. 
 
FRAMEWORK FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS   
The framework for further analysis is made up of three themes, each of which explain 
how militaries in Southeast Asia can increase their political influence. The following three 
themes make up the framework; 1) the weakness of civilian institutions and the involvement 
of the military in political institutions, 2) the military’s internal security role, 3) the military’s 
corporate interests.  These three themes will be used to illustrate the political influence of the 
TNI before and after democratic transition in Indonesia and the current level of political 
influence of the Tatmadaw in Myanmar. The same framework will then be used to assess 
the likely political influence of the Tatmadaw in a future democratic Myanmar.  
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CHAPTER TWO: THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF THE TNI 
 
Situated at the strategically important cross-roads of Indo-Pacific trade routes, 
Indonesia is a complex country made up of over 17,500 islands over an area of 
approximately two million square kilometres.66 The country straddles the equator from the 
Indian Ocean in the west, through the Java, Banda and Timor Seas, and into the Pacific 
Ocean in the east (See Map 2). Indonesia’s 253 million people come from diverse ethnic 
groups, including Javanese, Sundanese, Malay, Batak, Madurese, and the Minangkabau, as 
well as many other smaller groups.67 Although Bahasa Indonesia is the official language and 
is spoken by much of the population, there are some 700 other languages in use in 
Indonesia. 
This chapter seeks to answer a core question of this paper; to what extent has the 
TNI lost political influence in the democratic era? To answer this question, this chapter will 
be made up of two sections. The first section will discuss the level of the TNI’s political 
influence from when it was founded in 1945 until 1998, when President Suharto ceded 
power to his deputy, Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie. The second section will define what the 
political influence of the military looks like in the democratic era of Indonesian politics. A 
comparison of the pre and post-democracy findings will answer this aspect of the core 
question. Both parts of this chapter will be made up of three sections each representing one 
of the aspects of the framework derived from the core findings of the theory chapter. 
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PART ONE:  
THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF THE TNI PRIOR TO DEMOCRACY 
 
 This section seeks to understand the extent of the TNI’s political influence prior to 
democracy and will form an argument based around the framework derived from the theory 
chapter. Three sections will be organised chronologically starting from the Indonesian 
Revolution in the mid 1940s and ending with Suharto’s downfall in 1998. The first section will 
show how the TNI entered the political realm during the Revolution and subsequent early 
period of democracy as a result of the weakness of the civilian institutions of that era. The 
second section will illustrate the extent of the TNI’s internal security role, especially with 
regards to counterinsurgency campaigns against Dar al-Islam and the occupation of East 
Timor. The third section will argue that the TNI’s corporate interests allowed it to create off 
budget funding which enabled a level of autonomy, thus increasing its overall influence. 
 
THE WEAKNESS OF CIVILIAN INSTITUTIONS AND THE SUBSEQUENT INVOLVEMENT 
OF THE TNI IN POLITICS PRIOR TO DEMOCRACY 
 Speaking to Bilveer Singh in 1998, President Habibie explained that following the 
Indonesian Revolution (1945-1949), the TNI “[…] was the most organised and most 
disciplined force in the [political] court, then dominated by weak and divided civilian 
leaders.”68 This section seeks to understand the weakness of civilian institutions and the 
involvement of the TNI in political institutions prior to democratisation. The passage will 
argue that prior to democracy, while civilian institutions remained weak, the TNI was the 
most dominant actor in Indonesian politics, either directly or indirectly through its political 
party, GOLKAR. This enabled the TNI to become twined to various aspects of political life, 
including civilian institutions and political parties. 
The TNI acquired its political orientation from its inception, during the Revolution.69 
Indonesian politicians of that era failed to negotiate a diplomatic solution, whereas the TNI 
was successful in militarily defeating the Dutch who had returned to ‘their’ colony following 
the defeat of the Japanese.70 Indonesian politics in the early 1950s were democratic. 
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However, the situation remained fragile.71 This democratic period saw seventeen different 
cabinets formed between 1945 and 1957.72 A Prime Minister effectively ran the country while 
Sukarno remained a figure-head President.73 Although there was some limited fragmentation 
within the TNI, namely with Islamic fundamentalists, the organisation maintained a strong 
central leadership framework which enabled the military to be a unified political force. The 
weakness of the democratic system of the early 1950’s led President Sukarno to declare his 
Guided Democracy, whereby he lost his figure head role and effectively become the leader 
of Indonesia.74    
 During the Guided Democracy, Sukarno cancelled elections, banned his opponents 
and distributed parliamentary seats to the country’s so-called “functional groups” which 
included the TNI.75 Sukarno became an increasingly authoritarian leader while the TNI 
accepted its Middle Way doctrine whereby it would not seek to dominate politics but would 
not remove itself from the political arena.76 This power sharing arrangement was sufficient 
for the TNI’s political desires at the time until the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai 
Komunis Indonesia: PKI) became increasingly influential. 
In the early 1960s the PKI was the TNI’s main rival for political dominance. There 
was a triangle power relationship formed by the TNI, the PKI and Sukarno.77 Sukarno had 
allied himself with the PKI which resulted in the TNI feeling politically threatened.78 With 
Indonesian confrontation in Malayan Borneo (The Indonesian Confrontation: Konfrontasi), 
the communists’ influence over Sukarno had become uncomfortable for the TNI. On 30 
September and October 1 1965, six TNI generals were killed by the 30 September 
Movement, a group linked to the PKI.79 Sukarno allowed the Indonesian Army’s Strategic 
Reserve (Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat: KOSTRAD) Commander, Major 
General Suharto, to restore calm in Jakarta through martial law.80 The PKI was made illegal 
and the TNI resorted to the killing of between 200,000 and 1.5 million PKI party activists and 
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associates, which is among one of the bloodiest episodes of modern history.81 With the PKI 
destroyed, Sukarno lost his grip on power and Suharto’s TNI became the most dominant 
actor in Indonesia.82  
 Suharto became Indonesia’s strongman, leading the country from 1966 until 1998, a 
period referred to as the ‘New Order’.83 During the New Order, the TNI cemented its place in 
Indonesian society with the formalisation of dwi fungsi (dual function) doctrine while civilian 
institutions remained even weaker than during Sukarno’s Guided Democracy. Dwi fungsi 
went a step further than the Middle Way and explicitly noted that the TNI would be involved 
in “ideological, political, social, economic, cultural and religious fields.”84 This allowed military 
officers to be involved in various government organisations that would otherwise be 
dominated by civilian leaders. This included senior civil service posts, governorships and 
ambassadorial posts.85 During the New Order, the TNI was granted approximately 75 of 414 
seats in the Indonesian parliament, known as the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia: MPR).86 As well as the formal seats, it 
dominated the GOLKAR party which was essentially the government party for the entirety of 
the New Order; in effect, the TNI dominated the MPR outright.   
 As well as parliament, the TNI dominated politics at the regional level through the 
Territorial Command Structure (TCS) which operates in parallel with the weak civilian 
bureaucracy from Jakarta to the village-level (See Table 1 on the following page).87 The 
territorial structure was implemented as a result of General Abdul Haris Nasution’s Territorial 
Warfare doctrine of 1962, which sought to limit the ability of the PKI and other internal 
groups from operating in the provinces.88  As well as the TCS, military officers were 
appointed as governors on the supposedly civilian side of regional politics. In 1965, 12 out of 
24 governorships were headed by TNI officers.89 This had the effect of placing TNI 
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personnel at all levels of central and regional government. No other institution had this level 
of political clout.   
 
TABLE 1: The TNI’s Territorial Command Structure (TCS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indonesia’s economy had grown steadily toward a newly industrialised status by the time 
the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) hit in 1997. Suharto’s New Order Government, formed 
under the conditions of the late 1960s and early 1970s, had not kept pace with the rapid 
economic and social change of the early 1990s.90 Societal factors, coupled with the sudden 
onset of AFC in 1997 saw Suharto’s power slip. The rate of economic growth in Indonesia 
went from a positive eight percent in 1996, to a negative 14 percent in 1998 and the 
unemployment rate went from around 20 percent to 50 percent.91  This saw demonstrations 
throughout Indonesia demanding the resignation of Suharto.92 Suharto reluctantly agreed to 
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cede power to his deputy Habibie, and announced that there would be presidential elections 
and that he would not stand.93 After three decades of authoritarian rule, Suharto’s New 
Order government had come to an end.  
The TNI’s role in politics during the Guided Democracy and the New Order was often 
justified in terms of making up for the “weakness of civilian institutions.”94 With the civilian 
population exhibiting strength and rising up against Suharto the support provided by the TNI 
to Suharto began to dwindle. “With the downfall of President Suharto, the military soon found 
itself under heavy public criticism and pressure that it should withdraw from politics sooner 
rather than later.”95 
 
THE INTERNAL SECURITY FOCUS OF THE TNI PRIOR TO DEMOCRACY 
 
“My politics are at the end of the bayonet.”96 
Suharto, 1948 
 
For much of its history, the TNI has been a force focused on internal security. 
Alagappa’s argument that there is a direct correlation between a military’s internal security 
role and that military’s overall political influence is thus a solid theme for further analysis of 
the TNI.97  This section will explore the TNI’s internal security role from independence until 
1998 when the New Order administration came to an end. During the New Order, the TNI 
was the most dominant internal security actor in Indonesia. This section will argue that the 
core role of the TNI for much of its existence was internal security; it was an inward looking 
military. This was a contributing factor to the TNI becoming the most politically influential 
force in Indonesia.  
The Revolution is often understood as a conflict between the Dutch and Indonesian 
Nationalists; however Dar al-Islam, a militant Islamist group, also took part in the conflict 
both against the Dutch and the Nationalists.98 As the Dutch ceded their claim to Indonesia, 
the Nationalists consolidated their power in the urban areas, while Dar al-Islam dominated 
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the rural and mountainous interior.99  In the early 1960s, the TNI formulated a strategy to 
combat the Islamists.100 The TNI’s pagar betis strategy (‘fence of calves’ or ‘human fence’) 
focused on defeating Dar al-Islam’s ability to move and hide in the mountainous interior.101  
The TNI focused on living with the population in order to deny Dar al-Islam access to rice 
paddies and other food sources.102 The Islamists were defeated by the TNI campaign in 
1962.103 The TNI’s Dar al-Islam saga further embedded the military with much of the 
population, which reinforced the territorial warfare strategy, the TCS and the TNI’s self 
perception as the guardian of the Unitary State of Indonesia, codified in the Sapta Marga 
(the soldier’s oath).104  
With the defeat of Dar al-Islam, elimination of warlords throughout the island group 
and the successful invasion of Irian Java, the TNI became the most dominant force in 
Indonesia.105 As noted earlier, the TNI destroyed the PKI following the deaths of six TNI 
generals. During this time the military was again called into govern through martial law.106 
With the PKI destroyed, Sukarno lost his grip on power and Suharto’s TNI became the most 
dominant actor in Indonesia.107  
The Police was militarised during the New Order. BRIMOB, the paramilitary force of 
the police, was responsible for counterterrorism until the TNI-AD’s (Army) Detachment 81 
was formed in 1982.108 A BRIMOB battalion was used in the initial invasion of East Timor in 
1975, which resulted in the former Portuguese colony officially becoming a territory of 
Indonesia the following year.109 The TNI governed East Timor through the deployment of 
approximately 20,000 troops.110 The TNI’s conduct in the occupation of East Timor is 
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remembered for its level of brutality and various human rights concerns, including the 
infamous Dili Massacre of 1991.111 
 
THE TNI’S CORPORATE INTERESTS PRIOR TO DEMOCRACY 
This sub-section will explore the TNI’s involvement in economic activities in pre-
democratic Indonesia. Alagappa and Mietzner agree that the military will likely assume a 
greater role in the corporate world if its governance role is expanded, which perpetuates the 
increasing political influence of the military; analysis of the TNI’s economic role in the pre-
democratic era supports this claim. This section will illustrate how the TNI became involved 
in the economy and how it increased its corporate interests especially during the New Order, 
consolidating its political influence further, largely as a result of the TCS. 
As a guerrilla force during the Revolution, individual units that made up the TNI were 
self-sufficient, raising their operational budget from the population.112 Dutch intelligence 
reporting during the Revolution indicated that as well as legitimate businesses, TNI 
personnel were involved in opium smuggling, and other illicit activity.113 In 1957, Dutch 
owned businesses were nationalised, with many coming under the control of the TNI.114 With 
the declaration of martial law, TNI commanders at the regional level found themselves with 
preferential business conditions due to the central role of the military.115  Konfrontasi 
(Confrontation) over the formation of Malaysia saw the TNI take over British companies 
throughout the archipelago.116 In 1968, the TNI consolidated Indonesian oil and gas 
enterprises into a single company; for many years PT. Pertamina was the TNI’s “major cash 
cow.”117 
The TCS provided, and still provides, the most significant opportunity for military 
commanders to profit from off-budget income. The TCS allows the TNI to conduct off-budget 
economic activities on a large scale because of its significant influencing role throughout the 
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entire bureaucracy.118  The structure gave rise to a patronage network throughout Indonesia. 
Commanders fostered partnerships with businessmen, creating off-budget funding for the 
TNI through informal, sometimes illegal activities.119 This gave commanders increased 
political influence in the regions and also provided them with the ability to accumulate 
personal wealth.  
 The foundations of the TNI’s business activities were already well laid by the time 
Suharto took power in October 1965. During the New Order period, the TNI significantly 
expanded its reach into the Indonesian economy, by intensifying its operations; both the 
legal businesses and the other less formal activities.120 Suharto restricted the defence 
budget, which made TNI commanders more self-reliant on off-budget funding. 121 At the 
same time Suharto controlled the access to many of the legal activities which “fostered a 
high degree of loyalty.”122 By keeping commanders enmeshed in the patronage network, 
Suharto simply purchased loyalty through korupsi, kolusi dan nepotisme (corruption, 
collusion and nepotism – a popular slogan at the time describing Suharto’s patronage 
network).123 Military commanders were receptive to Suharto’s offer of “almost unlimited 
access to the resources and facilities of the state and power to influence allocation of 
import/export licences, forestry concessions and state contracts.”124 This provided Suharto 
with a loyal military and gave the TNI political influence through increased economic 
autonomy.125  In 1997, the AFC began to seriously affect the longevity of many TNI 
businesses, as well as other aspects of the Indonesian economy.126 This added to the 
growing pressure on Suharto to step down. Interestingly, as Suharto’s patronage network felt 
the brunt of the AFC, the TNI’s support of Suharto began to wane. 
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PART TWO: THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF THE TNI  
IN THE DEMOCRATIC ERA 
 
This part seeks to understand the TNI’s political influence in the democratic era of 
Indonesian politics and will form an argument based on the framework presented in the 
theory chapter of this paper. The first section will discuss the weakness and strength of 
civilian institutions and leaders in the democratic era and how the TNI’s political influence 
has largely receded in the democratic era, especially in the early years of reform (reformasi). 
The first section will also note that in recent years the TNI seems to be becoming more 
political than in the earlier years of reformasi. The second section will show that the TNI has 
largely remained focused on internal security, not external defence. The separation of the 
police from the TNI has been the most significant reform initiative with regards to internal 
security. The third section will argue that although the TNI was unable to avoid the economic 
consequences of very different political conditions in the democratic era, it still retains some 
influence as a result of its ability to make off-budget funds. This section will argue that overall 
the TNI has lost political influence in the democratic era. However, it remains politically 
orientated and retains a degraded level of influence. In recent years, the TNI has 
increasingly sought to re-enter the political realm. 
 
THE WEAKNESS OF CIVILIAN INSTITUTIONS AND THE SUBSEQUENT INVOLVEMENT 
OF THE TNI IN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE DEMOCRATIC ERA 
 
The democratic era has seen the TNI recede politically, however it has not fully lost 
its political orientation. The TNI has lost its seats in the MPR but maintains its TCS. It has 
scrapped its infamous dwi fungsi doctrine but has reserved a trusted place in Indonesian 
society with strong links to the population. It has cut ties with the GOLKAR party and at the 
same time, retired officers are increasingly involved in political parties. This section seeks to 
understand the weakness of civilian institutions and the TNI’s involvement in the political 
realm in Indonesia’s democratic era. In recent years the TNI seems to be becoming 
increasingly more political than in the earlier years of reformasi. During the Jokowi era, the 
TNI’s modus operandi seems to be more akin to dwi fungsi than to reformasi.  
President Habibie’s government lasted from May 1998 until October 1999. This period 
was the start of reformasi (Indonesia Reform Period from 1998) which saw significant reform 
of CMR in Indonesia, including the separation of the police from the TNI, the military reduce 
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its share of seats in parliament and the military ceasing ties with the New Order’s dominating 
GOLKAR Party.127 These reforms were defined and implemented by the TNI with no civilian 
oversight. This led to the omission of important reform items such as the TCS, which 
remains intact.128 The TNI kept a significant level of influence over Habibie because of his 
dependence on the support provided by the military.129  
Writing at the time of Habibie’s tenure, Andrew Renton-Green argued that most 
Indonesians, including the military, believed that Habibie did not have the ability to divorce 
himself from the influence of Suharto. In the view of many, Suharto remained the “dalang” 
(puppet-master).130 However, within a short period of replacing Suharto, Habibie announced 
that East Timor would be granted the right to independence.131 This outraged the TNI who 
had fought a counterinsurgency campaign in the province ever since it invaded the former 
Portuguese colony in 1975. The TNI supported various pro-integration militia groups with 
weapons and funding.132 It is hard to imagine East Timor being granted the right to 
independence under Suharto, or any other government strongly linked to the TNI. Therefore, 
this episode does in fact illustrate that Habibie felt he had enough political support and 
strength to not worry about the TNI’s reaction. However the same episode shows how the 
TNI acted autonomously of the central government at that time, by supporting the various 
militia groups without the approval of central government. Habibie was replaced by President 
Abdurrahman Wahid on 20 October 1999, only seventeen months after Habibie was 
appointed.  
Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of Sukarno, was Wahid’s main opponent in the 
1999 election.133 Wahid was an unlikely president as he only received ten percent of the 
vote.134 However, Wahid was able to secure the support of a wide spread alliance of political 
parties, including the popular GOLKAR Party and smaller Islamic parties as well as all 
remaining representatives from the TNI.135 Such complex coalitions have become common 
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in Indonesia’s democratic politics and are referred to as ‘grand coalitions’ which are 
inherently weak and unstable.136  
The TNI commander, Wiranto had supported Wahid instead of the incumbent Habibie.137 
Wahid had noted that without the political support of the TNI, he would not have been able to 
become president; “You still can’t become President of Indonesia without the military. 
They’re out of the bureaucracy, and all of that, but that’s nonsense. Nonsense! They’re still 
strong, and Wiranto will support me to become President.”138 Wanting to maintain political 
stability, Wahid supported Megawati to become the vice-president, which she did.139 There 
was a level of distrust between Wahid and TNI commanders, which was exacerbated when 
the President proposed Aceh be given a similar independence opportunity to East Timor, 
through a referendum.140 TNI commanders viewed civilian politicians, including Wahid, as 
amateurs, especially in regards to internal security concerns, like Aceh.141 The rise of 
political violence especially in Kalimantan and Aceh further exacerbated the fragmentary 
nature of Wahid’s coalition to the point of unsustainability. This led to Wahid’s impeachment 
in parliament in favour of Megawati. Wahid had simply alienated too many people within the 
military and political elite.142 The short tenure of the first democratically elected President of 
the post-Suharto era illustrates a weakness of the early democratic system; later presidents 
would last longer.  
Megawati became Indonesia’s fifth president in July 2001. Megawati did not push for 
reform within the TNI and is remembered as a “did nothing” president.143 As such, she 
maintained the support of the TNI for much of her presidency.144 Running up to the 2004 
election, Megawati did little to change the widespread deteriorating public opinion of her 
government’s effectiveness, something the TNI were keen to distance themselves from.145 
Prior to the 2004 elections, the TNI relinquished all of its seats in the MPR.146 GOLKAR’s 
nominee for the 2004 election, retired General Wiranto, was a strong contender for the 2004 
                                                             
136
 Sandra Hamid, “Indonesian Politics in 2012: Coalitions, Accountability and the Future of Democracy,” 
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 48, no. 3, (2012): 326. 
137 Kingsbury, South-East Asia: A Political Profile, 371. 
138 Mietzner, The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism, and 
Institutional Resistance, 17. 
139 Kingsbury, South-East Asia: A Political Profile, 370-371 
140 Honna, “Security Challenges and Military Reform in Post-authoritarian Indonesia: The Impact of Separatism, 
Terrorism, and Communal Violence.” 187. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Kingsbury, South-East Asia: A Political Profile, 378. 
143 Kingsbury, South-East Asia: A Political Profile, 378. 
144 Ibid., 38-285. 
145
 Ibid., 378. 
146
 Mietzner and Misol, “Military Businesses in post-Suharto Indonesia: Decline, Reform and Persistence.” 106. 
34 
 
 
elections, however it was another retired general who became the president in 2004, retired 
General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY).  
SBY of the Democratic Party was elected president with 60.8 percent of the vote in 
2004.147 Internal security remained a serious issue during the tenure of SBY. Sumatra, 
particularly Aceh, was the worst hit area following the Boxing Day Tsunami of 2004, with 
approximately 165,000 killed.148 This led the TNI and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) to 
cease hostilities with a peace agreement. The compromise saw GAM renounce their claim to 
independence but establish a semi-autonomous region where sharia law was allowed to be 
implemented.149  SBY remained president for a decade to the day (20 October 2004 – 20 
October 2014). SBY is remembered for conducting only modest reform, acting cautiously, 
however making some progress in the face of very difficult political and security 
circumstances.150 
In the democratic era, POLRI reports directly to the president while the TNI report to the 
Minister of Defence; this is one positive democratic CMR development.151 However, the 
Ministry of Defence is still dominated by the TNI, with only limited civilian oversight and a 
retired general remaining the Defence Minister (General Ryamizard Ryacudu). The TNI also 
retains control of the Armed Forces Intelligence Agency (Badan Intelijen Strategis: BAIS).152 
BAIS is one of two main intelligence agencies in Indonesia, the other being the State 
Intelligence Agency (Baden Intelijen Negara: BIN) which reports directly to the president and 
is directed by retired TNI General Sutiyoso.153   
The 2014 election of Joko Widodo, commonly known as Jokowi, was viewed both 
domestically and internationally as a boost to democracy in Indonesia.154 Jokowi was seen 
as a president who “would break through the self-serving facades of vested interests 
hobbling the economy and the government, and deliver for the poor and deprived.”155 The 
first year of Jokowi’s presidency has seen him lose the support of parliament, and even his 
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own party.156 The weakness of Jokowi’s cabinet was on show during the 2015 Rohingya 
refugee issue. While Jokowi explained that Indonesia would assist resettling the refugees 
that landed on Sumatra, the TNI Commander General Moeldoko made comments that ran 
counter to Jokowi’s, noting “we still have many problems in our country, and should not be 
burdened by this [Rohingya] problem.”157 This crisis shows that civilian oversight of the TNI, 
which is a prerequisite for democratic CMR, is still not fully implemented in Indonesia.  
A significant political episode for Jokowi involved his initial police chief nominee Budi 
Gunawan, POLRI and the Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan 
Korupsi: KPK). KPK laid corruption charges against Gunawan the day before he was to be 
formally nominated in parliament. This led POLRI to lay criminal charges against the deputy 
chair of the KPK.158 This episode became extremely complex with the TNI effectively 
guarding the KPK buildings from POLRI retaliation and Megawati demanding Jokowi to do 
more to support Gunawan.159 This episode epitomises Jokowi’s presidency thus far; it shows 
the strength of Megawati, the weakness of Jokowi, conflict between POLRI and the KPK, 
and manoeuvring by the TNI. Jakarta remains an extremely complex political environment. 
 
THE INTERNAL SECURITY ROLE OF THE TNI IN THE DEMOCRATIC ERA 
 This section seeks to understand the TNI’s role in internal security in the democratic 
era. It will argue that although significant shifts in Indonesia’s internal security framework did 
occur in the first years of reformasi, notably the separation of the police from the TNI, the 
military has largely retained its focus on internal security, jostling with POLRI for leadership 
of the internal security domain. However, the TNI has lost political influence in the 
democratic era as it is no longer the sole arbiter of state violence in Indonesia.   
From 1998 the goal of the New Paradigm, which was a term given to the military 
aspect of reformasi, was to “shift the TNI’s traditional focus from internal security to external 
security.”160 A practical aspect of the New Paradigm saw the police separate from the TNI in 
1999, which implied that the newly established POLRI would be responsible for internal 
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security, while the TNI would be responsible for national defence.161 There was nothing 
novel about the New Paradigm; it had been drafted by reform minded officers in 1996 and 
1997.162 From a political influence point of view, there were two points that the New 
Paradigm noted; the military was content not to be at the forefront of all national affairs and 
they acknowledged the necessity of role-sharing with other national forces.163 Statements 
made by the TNI and the closely aligned Ministry of Defence since, contradict the New 
Paradigm by noting that there remains a requirement for the TNI to be heavily involved in 
internal security operations.164 Thus, the TNI appears to be interested in retaining much of its 
historical internal security role. 
The Ministry of Defence’s White Paper of 2003 provides the justification for the TNI’s 
internal security role in the democratic era, and thus illustrated a trend away from the New 
Paradigm.165  The White Paper argues that internal factors have the potential to disrupt and 
threaten Indonesia.166 The White Paper notes that it is the duty of the TNI to conduct so 
called Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), such as countering insurgency, 
combating international crime, aid to the civil community, humanitarian and peace tasks.167 
The White Paper rightfully adds “MOOTW may create an impression on the confusion or an 
overlap between the role of the TNI with other institutions, especially on the authority of the 
POLRI in the case of general security and public order.”168 The paper states that the TNI’s 
role is “the use of armed force to overcome a threat.”169 Whereas POLRI’s role is to 
“establish security and public order according to the rule of the law.”170 The White Paper 
goes on to propose that the roles of the TNI and POLRI need to be stipulated based on the 
escalation level and threat spectrum.171 The White Paper is alluding to the TNI being 
responsible for threats from the medium to high end, including terrorism and insurgency 
whereas POLRI would be left with the lower end threats, including crime.  
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The separation of the police force from the TNI in 1999 caused competition between 
the two security agencies which was further exacerbated with the rise of terrorism. In 2002, 
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) conducted an attack on a Bali nightclub which killed 202 people, 
including 88 Australians.172 JI conducted further large scale attacks on Western targets at 
the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in 2002, the Australian Embassy in 2004 and another attack in 
Bali in 2005.173 The rise in terrorism, especially the Bali bombing of 2002, led the newly 
formed POLRI to establish a specialist counterterrorism squad, Detasemen Khusus 88 
(Detachment 88).174 The development of Detachment 88 created a tense relationship 
between POLRI and the TNI who still saw themselves as the lead defence and security 
agency.175 The conflict between the TNI and POLRI is a point of contention that continues.176 
The Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) notes that even with POLRI’s 
capabilities arguably sufficient to counter any terror threat to Indonesia, the TNI maintains 
specialist counterterrorism units within all three services (army, navy and air force).177 In 
early 2015, the TNI conducted so-called ‘exercises’ in the same area of Poso, Sulawesi 
where POLRI were conducting Operation Camar Maleo to capture Indonesia’s most wanted 
terrorist, Santoso (also known as Abu Wardah).178 A TNI spokesperson said it was just a 
coincidence that the TNI were conducting exercises in the same remote region of Sulawesi 
where POLRI were conducting their operation.179  The competition over counterterrorism 
provides an insight into the current conflict between the TNI and POLRI and shows how the 
TNI is losing its historical influence derived from being the sole arbiter of state violence in 
Indonesia.  
 
THE TNI’S CORPORATE INTERESTS IN THE DEMOCRATIC ERA 
This section will explore the TNI’s involvement in economic activities during the 
democratic era. Financial independence increases the political influence of the military and 
limits the ability of the central government to oversee the military’s activities. Having the 
ability to fund initiatives that the civilian government has not budgeted for, allows the military 
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to bypass civilian policy processes and make decisions that may run counter to the interests 
of the government.180 This occurred in East Timor in 1999 where the TNI unofficially, and 
without the central government’s mandate, backed pro-Indonesian militia groups.181 This is 
an example of the danger in allowing any democratic country’s military to conduct off-budget 
economic activity. 
The TNI headquarters and service branches own at least one foundation each, with 
the TNI-AD owning sixteen different foundations.182 These foundations, which were formed 
under Suharto’s New Order, control holding companies that invest capital into individual 
businesses.183 Many of these TNI owned businesses operate in mining, construction, 
forestry, transportation, agribusiness, insurance, and airport management.184 At different 
levels of command, the TNI is involved in informal economic activities, some of which are 
illegal. The TNI collaborates with the private sector, including leasing publicly owned land 
and buildings for profit.185   A lucrative earner for the TNI is the security and protection 
services sector. In 2010 alone Freeport-McMoRan, a major Western mining multinational 
cooperation operating in Irian Jaya (West Papua), spent USD$14 million on security 
measures provided by 3,000 TNI and POLRI personnel.186 Illegal logging throughout 
Indonesia, but especially in Irian Jaya, is another key earner for the TNI.187 
The TNI has lost economic clout as a result of the very different conditions of the 
post-Suharto era, and not because of the limited and contradictory reform measures 
instigated by the government. Under Suharto’s New Order, TNI businesses had almost 
unlimited access to the resources of the state through the TCS.188 With the fall of Suharto, 
competition for enterprise ensued with the TNI, civilian politicians, emerging conglomerates, 
and the newly independent POLRI, all vying for resources.189 The territorial structure of the 
TNI has remained in the democratic era which means the economic opportunities presented 
via the system are still available today. Government led reforms have been contradictory and 
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ambiguous enabling the TNI to retain many business interests. In 2004, President Megawati 
Sukarnoputri signed Law No. 34/2004 which banned all TNI personnel from involvement in 
business activities and required the TNI to relinquish ownership of all businesses to the 
central government within five years.190 However, with the October 2009 deadline 
approaching President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) issued Presidential Decree 
No.43/2009 which is viewed by the Human Rights Watch as a serious reversal of previous 
reform initiatives set out in Law No. 34/2004.191 As of 2008 the TNI continued to own 
between 1,335 (independent inventory) and 1,153 (government inventory) business entities, 
across most sectors.192 
The TNI cite the inability of the central government to provide adequate funds for the 
defence budget as the core reason for the TNI bolstering its funding through profiteering.193 
In 2000, the then Minister of Defence Juwono Sudarsono announced that the budget only 
covered 30 percent of the TNI’s requirements.194  Therefore, the TNI required well over half 
of its funding to come from off-budget sources. In 2005, Juwono adjusted the figure to 50 
percent, meaning that for the TNI to function, it still required significant funding from off-
budget means.195  In 2010, Juwono noted to Lisa Misol that the government now provided 80 
percent of the budget.196 Mietzner notes that it is impossible to establish what the real 
budget looks like but Juwono’s vantage point, as the then Minister of Defence, is “the closest 
to a workable approximation.”197 The TNI’s increasing reliance on the central government will 
likely decrease the political influence of the TNI further.  
 
CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER TWO  
Part one of this chapter focused on understanding the extent of the TNI’s political 
influence from the Revolution until Suharto stood down in 1998. The first section illustrated 
how the TNI became involved in politics in the first place, during the Revolution, and how it 
dominated politics until 1998. As noted by Habibie, the TNI was the most dominant political 
actor during the Revolution, while civilian leaders remained weak and divided. Civilian 
institutions remained weak throughout the early democratic period which followed the 
Revolution, largely as a result of the fragmentation of civilian political entities. During the 
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Guided Democracy, the TNI remained the dominant political institution, only being 
challenged briefly by the PKI which was destroyed shortly thereafter. During Suharto’s New 
Order, the TNI replaced its Middle Way doctrine in favour of dwi fungsi which cemented the 
TNI’s domestic role. The second section showed how the TNI has its roots in internal 
security rather than external defence, which further expanded its political influence. The TNI 
has been involved in a number of counterinsurgency campaigns, the most notable of which 
include the conflict against Dar al-Islam and the occupation of East Timor. The strong 
internal security role of the TNI allowed it to become enmeshed in the nation’s fabric through 
the TCS. The third section explored the political effect of the TNI’s corporate interest prior to 
democracy. It was found that the TNI’s ability to create off budget funding enabled a level of 
autonomy from central government, even during the New Order when the TNI and Suharto 
were in close association. The culminating argument of this section is that prior to 
democracy the TNI was the most politically influential institution in Indonesia, both at the 
central government level in Jakarta and at the village level through its TCS. 
Part two of this chapter analysed the extent of the TNI’s political influence in the 
democratic era.  In conclusion, it should be noted that the TNI has lost political clout as a 
result of reform undertaken in the wake of the democratic era. Reformasi saw the TNI give 
up its seats in the MPR, cease ties with the GOLKAR party and shelve its dwi fungsi 
doctrine. However, important reform items were omitted from reformasi, including the TCS 
which remains intact and allows the TNI to influence politics throughout the regions. 
Habibie’s decision to allow East Timor the right to independence was an illustration of the 
changing times. However, the TNI showed their political desires by backing militia groups, 
something that was made possible through the TNI’s corporate interests. Although the TNI’s 
self induced New Paradigm took practical steps toward increasing democratic CMR, namely 
the separation of the police from the armed forces, the TNI has retained its focus on internal 
security, jostling with POLRI for leadership of the internal security domain. The competition 
between the TNI and POLRI was recently on show in Poso, Sulawesi where both POLRI 
operations and TNI exercises conflictingly sought to neutralise the same terrorist leader, 
Santoso (also known as Abu Wardah). The Poso incident of 2015 show that the TNI is not 
content in losing its internal security role. As the TNI’s governance role declined, so too has 
its involvement in the corporate world. Whereas legal reforms were sidestepped, the TNI 
was unable to avoid the economic consequences of very different political conditions in the 
democratic era. However, it should be stressed that the TNI is still very much involved in 
making off-budget profits which enables a degree of independence and supports the TNI’s 
ongoing, albeit reduced,  political influence, as well as providing personal wealth to TNI elite.  
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To conclude, and to answer the first aspect of the core question of this paper; the TNI 
has lost significant political influence in the democratic era but remains politically engaged. 
Signs that the TNI has lost influence include it loss of seats in parliament, its scrapping of 
ties with political parties and the separation of the police from the military. Signs that the TNI 
retains a political orientation include its retention of the TCS, competition with POLRI over 
internal security and its continuation of a number of corporate interests, which also hinders 
democratic CMR.  
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CHAPTER THREE: 
THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF THE TATMADAW  
Located in the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea, Myanmar is a country 
surrounded by approximately one third of the world’s total population, sharing land borders 
with Bangladesh, India, China, Laos and Thailand (See Map 2 on the following page).198 
Myanmar’s population of 56 million inhabitants are predominantly Buddhist, with Christian 
and Muslim minorities.199 The population is officially derived from the following major ethnic 
groups; Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Chin, Mon, Rakhine, Shan and the majority Bamar who make 
up 67.9 percent of the population.200 Officially the seven major ethnic groups are further 
divided into 135 so called sub-nationality groups. The government does not recognise 
certain ethnic groups as legitimate, including the Muslim minority referred to as the Rohingya 
who Naypyidaw argues are illegal immigrants from Bangladesh.201 Without getting into the 
detail, it is suffice to say that Myanmar is ethnographically complex, however dominated by 
the majority Bamar.202 
Since independence from the British in 1948, Myanmar has been dominated by its 
Armed Forces, the Tatmadaw who have ruled over the country through junta-style 
governments.203 Armed conflict has remained commonplace in Myanmar where ethnic 
groups have sought independence from the Bamar dominated junta.204 The economy, 
formerly one of the most developed in Southeast Asia, has been devastated by years of 
mismanagement under the military government.205 For much of the past five decades, 
Myanmar was described as a closed economy.206 In the 1950s, over 20 percent of 
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Myanmar’s GDP was derived from the export market; this was reduced to a mere one and a 
half percent by the 1990s.207 
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The country’s climate and rich agricultural land is underutilised as a result of 
economic mismanagement and the practical restrictions of manual labour; farming methods 
have remained largely constant for decades, employing simple ploughs, water buffalos and 
natural fertilizers.208 As such, the agricultural sector in Myanmar has considerable 
opportunities for expansion if its infrastructure is modernised and it’s economy opened up to 
the world.209 This seems plausible given President Thein Sein’s comments promoting the 
liberalisation of Myanmar’s economy and the possible democratisation of the political 
structure.210 However, opposition leader and democratic icon Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) has 
warned of being overly optimistic.211 She has a point; Myanmar is home to the world’s 
longest serving military dictatorship.212 
This chapter will be made up of two sections. The first section characterises the 
historical developments that led to the growth of the Tatmadaw’s political role and 
subsequent political influence.  The second section will use an analytical methodology 
referred to as the cone of plausibility to assist in providing plausible scenarios on the likely 
political influence of the Tatmadaw in a future democratic Myanmar.  
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PART ONE: 
THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF THE TATMADAW: 1948-2015 
This part is made up of three sections, each illustrating the political influence of the 
Tatmadaw alongside the framework produced from the theory chapter of this paper. Three 
parts will be organised chronologically from the early development of the Tatmadaw during 
the Second World War, though to immediately prior to the November 2015 elections. Section 
one will show that the Tatmadaw first became involved in politics during the struggle for 
independence. Since then, the Tatmadaw has remained the most politically influential actor 
in Myanmar, with a significant share of seats in parliament and a dominant role in various 
governments. The second section will illustrate that the Tatmadaw has been a force focused 
on internal security, as apposed to external defence. Over the past five decades the 
Tatmadaw has ruled over Myanmar and been the most politically influential force in the 
country largely as a result of its capability to conduct violence. As a result of its overreliance 
on coercion, the Tatmadaw has arguably lost much of its domestic legitimacy and credibility 
as a so-called patriotic institution, a concept it views as important.213 The third section will 
explore the Tatmadaw’s corporate interests and its effect on influence. Section three will 
struggle to comprehend how the most politically influential institution in Myanmar could 
possible garnish more political clout through its corporate interests.  
 
THE WEAKNESS OF CIVILIAN INSTITUTIONS AND THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE 
TATMADAW IN POLITICS: 1948-2015 
For five decades the Tatmadaw has been the sole administrator and builder of 
Myanmar.214 This section will describe how this came about and why after so long, the 
military is still the most powerful political entity in Myanmar. This section will argue that the 
military has retained its dominance by taking advantage of weak civilian governance on a 
number of occasions, including the establishment of the 1958 military caretaker government, 
the 1962 coup and the military’s political role in the 2008 constitution. Although modest 
reform toward democracy has taken place in recent years, the military is still firmly at the 
helm in Naypyidaw, directly with a significant share (25 percent) of parliamentary seats and 
indirectly through a very close association with the quasi-civilian ruling party, the Union 
Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). 
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The military’s central role in establishing an independent Myanmar provided the 
foundation for its later role as the country’s dominating political entity. During the Second 
World War, a group of nationalists, led by Aung San, father of ASSK, began a rebellion 
against the British colonial administration, based in Yangon.215 Aung San formed the 
Burmese Independence Army (BIA) in 1941 with the support of the Japanese, who then 
invaded the British colony the following year. In 1945, the BIA turned on their supporters and 
engaged the Japanese in guerrilla-style warfare.216 The British returned to Yangon soon 
after Japanese capitulation, and established the Burma Army, disbanding the BIA.217 Aung 
San left the army and formed the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL), 
maintaining pressure on the British until 1948, when London decided to grant Myanmar 
independence.218  
The weakness of civilian institutions in the years immediately after independence 
directly resulted in the military gaining significant political clout. This allowed the military to 
effectively become the government; gaining the most political influence any institution can 
yield. Shortly after independence, civil war broke out across Myanmar which meant that the 
newly formed government struggled to settle into political normality, while the military’s role 
expanded. This resulted in the Tatmadaw dominating the civil-military dynamic as it had 
such an important role to play in quelling violence throughout the country.219 The complex 
security situation was further exacerbated with the threat posed by Kuomintang troops 
intruding along the northern border from China. This had the effect of strengthening the 
operational capabilities of the Tatmadaw as the organisation was provided with extra 
resources.220  
In 1958, as the ruling civilian party (AFPFL) fragmented, General Ne Win displaced 
the civilian government and implanted a military caretaker Revolutionary Council.221 The 
Council “quashed the opposition, dismantled civil society with the exception of religious 
associations.”222 Ne Win returned Myanmar to civilian rule in 1960, only for the Tatmadaw to 
conduct a coup in 1962 and supplant the entire political and economic system.223 Ne Win’s 
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government remained in place until 1974 when it was replaced with a Tatmadaw civilian look 
alike, the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP).224 BSPP’s one party government was 
made up of retired and serving Tatmadaw officers; the BSPP was in effect a “civilian veneer” 
of the Tatmadaw.225 As its name suggested, the BSPP was of a Marxist-Leninist persuasion 
and was inward looking, shutting much of the world out for decades. 
An economic meltdown in 1988 led to widespread protests and a collapse of the 
BSPP government.226 For many Burmese, it seemed as if democratic reform was not just 
“possible but inevitable.”227 However, the Tatmadaw crushed this idea shortly thereafter by 
deploying forces into urban areas to displace protestors, killing thousands of unarmed 
civilians.228 The Tatmadaw then established a junta government in the State Law and Order 
Restoration Council (SLORC). This was not a coup but merely a continuation of Ni Win’s 
military government without its civilian veneer.229 In the 1990 general elections, ASSK’s 
National League for Democracy (NLD) won over 80 percent of the parliamentary seats and 
60 percent of the popular vote.230 The outcome of 1990 election was overturned by the junta 
in favour of the SLORC, while the military suppressed its main civilian opposition, the 
NLD.231 In 1997, the junta rebranded from SLORC to the State Peace and Development 
Council (SPDC). SPDC joined ASEAN in 1997, moved their administrative capital inland 
from Yangon to Naypyidaw in late 2005, drafted a new constitution in 2008, opened up 
aspects of the economy and announced elections for 2010.232 This was the start of a new 
period of contradictory political and economic reform. 
The constitution illustrates how the Tatmadaw seeks to hold onto aspects of political 
influence while ensuring civilian institutions remain weak. Clause 109 notes that the 
Tatmadaw will be automatically assigned 25 percent of the seats in both the upper house 
(Amyotha Hluttaw) and lower house (Pyithu Hluttaw) of the parliament (Pyidaungsu 
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Hluttaw).233 To make amendments to the constitution, 75 percent of the Pyithu Hluttaw must 
agree, something very unlikely without the backing of the military.234 It would require the 
support of every non-Tatmadaw politician, including civilian politicians who support or have 
strong associations with the military, such as the USDP. As such, the military effectively 
wields a veto and has the ability to overpower elected political actors. As well as the 
Tatmadaw’s assigned seating, the constitution has a built-in coup d’état clause whereby the 
military can be authorised by the President to conduct a coup to re-establish military 
control.235 The constitution bans people with children to a foreign citizen from becoming the 
president. This clause appears to be aimed at preventing ASSK from becoming president as 
she has two children to a Briton. 
ASSK boycotted the referendum on the 2008 constitution and 2010 elections but did 
finally become a member of parliament in the 2012 by-election.236 ASSK, who now 
represents Kawhmu Township (Yangon Region) in the Pyithu Hluttaw, is arguably the most 
popular politician in Myanmar.237 The fact that she can not become president without 
changes to the constitution illustrates the weakness of civilians and the strength of the 
military in Myanmar’s constitutional framework; the military’s dominance of politics and the 
weakness of civilian institutions is thus concrete until the military is itself willing to cede 
control to civilians. Due to her inability to become president, there is an inherent requirement 
for ASSK to bolster the leadership ranks of the NLD, something she seems unwilling to 
do.238 Even though the party is popular, the fact that the NLD lacks alternative leadership 
options directly limits the capacity of the NLD to gain a dominant role in the Pyidaungsu 
Hluttaw. 
The military backed USDP won 883 of 1154 seats in the 2010 election.239 The 
following year, Thein Sein was inaugurated as the first post-SPDC president. The fact that 
Thein Sein is a retired general and that the military-backed party won such a resounding 
victory (close to 60 percent) in the establishment of the quasi-civilian  administration, led 
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opposition groups and other countries alleging that the general election, the first in 20 years, 
was nothing more than a “sham.”240 The Tatmadaw on the other hand argue that the 2010 
election marks the transition-point from military rule to a civilian democracy, even though the 
military still have a significant share of the seats in parliament and Tatmadaw officers 
dominate the ruling party.241 The USDP has essentially retained the status quo of a military 
backed government while instigating all but limited reform initiatives, namely the release of 
thousands of political prisoners, including ASSK, the relaxation of censorship laws and the 
abolishment of a 25-year-old ban on public gatherings of more than five people.242 Modest 
reform has seen the easing of sanctions by several Western nations, a second order effect 
of which has seen foreign investment “flood” into Myanmar.243 Western interest in Myanmar 
has increased as a result. Western leaders have begun flocking to Naypyidaw. In 2014, this 
included U.S President Barack Obama, Australian Prime Minster Tony Abbott and New 
Zealand Prime Minister John Key.244  
Retired Tatmadaw officers have played an important role in the quasi-civilian 
administration, namely as members of the USDP. As a result, their influence is likely tied to 
the overall posture of the Tatmadaw, the USDP’s core supporter. Although in the quasi-
civilian era, retired Tatmadaw officers make up only a small minority of parliament (less than 
12 percent), they are disproportionately represented in more powerful legislative positions in 
parliament, such as speakerships.245 In a 2015 report, Renaud Egreteau argues that this 
shows where the power lies in Myanmar; in the hands of serving and retired Tatmadaw 
officers.246 The top two generals of the SPDC era, Senior General Than Shwe (former 
chairman of SPDC) and Vice-Senior General Maung Aye (former vice chairman of the 
SPDC), retired when the USDP was founded. It is believed these two personalities still 
continue to exercise some power over the USDP government.247 Although there are certainly 
going to be cases on the contrary, due to their inherent institutionalisation, retired military 
officers are likely to represent the interests and values of their former service more so than 
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others without a military background. As noted by Aung Sun Suu Kyi, “just because you 
change out of military uniform to civilian clothes, it does not mean your mind-set changes 
automatically.”248  
Myanmar is overwhelmingly Buddhist. Myanmar’s 400,000 Buddhist monks, spread 
across 45,000 monasteries, are interestingly “comparable in number to the Tatmadaw.”249 
Although not a “homogeneous mass,” the Sangha (Buddhist monastic order) does wield 
influence as a result of it being the only institution, other than the Tatmadaw, that spans the 
entire country with its own internal communication and structure.250 Because the Sangha 
spirituality represents the majority of the population, entities that have the support of the 
Buddhist organisation are likely to be seen in a positive light, providing legitimacy to such 
entities.251 Buddhist monks have been at the forefront of political discontent, including in the 
1988 and 2007 mass protests while supporting ASSK.252 This provides the NLD with a level 
of political legitimacy that the Tatmadaw, with its reliance on coercion, will never garnish. 
Religion is one aspect of the civil-military dynamic that the Tatmadaw has been unable to 
dominate.  
 
THE INTERNAL SECURITY FOCUS OF THE TATMADAW: 1948-2015 
This section seeks to understand how the Tatmadaw increased its political influence 
as a result of its focus on internal security. This section will argue that since 1948 the 
government has relied nearly exclusively on force to quell internal conflicts, only recently 
beginning to negotiate with ethnic groups.253 This heavy-handed approach has made the 
military politically influential because it has forcefully brought about political change while 
literally killing or imprisoning opponents; no other internal actor has the ability to physically 
force political change on such a scale as the Tatmadaw does.  However, as a result of the 
Tatmadaw’s use of violence to govern, which has resulted in human rights abuses, the 
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military has been pressured by internal and external actors to reform and has been 
increasingly viewed as an oppressive actor by much of the population. 
The Tatmadaw view their primary mission as the non-disintegration of the country, a 
point codified in the ‘Three Main National Causes,’ non-disintegration of the Union, non-
disintegration of national unity and perpetuation of national sovereignty.254 This has led the 
Tatmadaw to become involved in socio-political fields as well as the military realm.255 Since 
independence in 1948, the Tatmadaw has focused on internal security which has dominated 
Myanmar, especially in the border regions where the Bamar are not the majority, including 
Rakhine, Kachin, Shan, Kayah and Chin states (See Map 3).256 One conservative estimate 
found that there are approximately 100,000 armed militiamen under the command of nearly 
40 non-state groups and organisations.257  
Historically, the Tatmadaw argued that they were the only force capable of protecting 
the country from disintegration.258 The military felt they had a historical and moral obligation 
to protect the nation’s sovereignty from internal factors.259 Typically these insurgencies are 
led by an ethnic based armed force, such as the United Wa State Army, the Shan State 
Army and the Kachin Independence Army. Most of these ethnically based groups support a 
political structure and administer a shadow government in their respective area. In October 
2015, only a month before the elections, the Tatmadaw managed to sign ceasefire 
agreements with eight ethnic groups, including the Karen National Union and the Restoration 
Council of Shan State.260 
The military has employed enemy-centric counterinsurgency tactics aimed at 
destroying the ethnic based groups, not trying to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the 
population, something other counterinsurgency strategies emphasise.261 According to 
Harvard University’s International Human Rights Clinic, military campaigns have seen the 
Tatmadaw commit human rights abuses on a vast and arguably institutional level, including 
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extrajudicial killings, sexual violence against women and girls, the recruitment of child 
soldiers, the use of landmines to inflict civilian casualties and indiscriminate artillery 
shelling.262 In recent years, the Tatmadaw has begun releasing child soldiers, the slowness 
of which is drawing criticism.263 The Tatmadaw’s violent behaviour has understandably 
caused international condemnation on a number of occasions, as well as intense domestic 
scrutiny.264 Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe argues that the Tatmadaw’s own legitimacy and 
credibility as patriotic institution has been gravely compromised as a result of its violent 
behaviour.265 This has changed the way much of the population view the military, including 
the Bamar.266 
 
THE TATMADAW’S CORPORATE INTERESTS: 1948-2015 
With extra funding, both off-budget and on-budget, the military can do a number of 
things; it can provide extra wealth to its elite, it can buy new military capabilities, it can 
conduct operations as well as build national infrastructure. Historically, it was widely believed 
that the Tatmadaw controlled much of the natural resources and economy of Myanmar, 
providing it access to the riches of the state.267 Since 2011, this has changed significantly 
with the economy being opened up; the Tatmadaw has lost its dominating economic role. 
However, this is not necessarily a negative development for the military as the economy, 
now much larger, provides the Tatmadaw with an increased budget. This section seeks to 
understand the relationship between the Tatmadaw’s corporate interests and the 
organisation’s politically influential. This section will argue that the Tatmadaw’s corporate 
ventures and dominance of the economy merely followed its trajectory as the country’s 
dominant political actor. As such it is difficult to deduce that the Tatmadaw is more influential 
as a result of its corporate interests as it is the dominating entity.  
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Following the 1962 coup, the junta’s so-called ‘Burmese Way to Socialism’ 
nationalised various enterprises in Myanmar, placing them under the control of Yangon; in 
effect, the Tatmadaw administered the majority of the economy.268 Individual army units also 
went into business, even though they were not legally entitled to do so.269 Unit level profits 
supposedly provided income to the respective regimental funds for the benefit of the unit’s 
personnel and families.270 Units also leased out state-owned premises, on sold electricity 
and rented out military trucks for commercial purposes.271  
Prior to the establishment of the current quasi-civilian government, the Tatmadaw 
dominated Myanmar’s economy. Myanmar’s Trade Council was run by the military and 
chaired by the army commander; no company could export of import without a permit from 
this council.272 Economic decision making was controlled by the regime, not by technocrats 
in the relevant civilian ministries.273 These factors have changed significantly in the quasi-
civilian era; the Trade Council has been abolished, the Tatmadaw’s dominance of economic 
decision making has receded in favour of civilian technocrats, while military run businesses 
have all but a limited role.  
In the junta era, the Tatmadaw received approximately a quarter of the total government 
budget, with the healthcare sector receiving less than two percent.274 Although the military’s 
portion of the budget as of 2012-13 was reduced to 14.4 percent of the total government 
budget, the actual budgetary amount has increased by over 60 percent.275 As such, the 
military may see economic reform in a positive light, especially if their budget continues to 
increase as it has, something which is being forecasted.276 
Corruption remains rife in Myanmar, which provides an alternate funding stream for 
Tatmadaw’s elite. A still standing 1997 law orders Tatmadaw commanders to remain self-
sufficient in their respective area of operation, pressuring commanders to establish their own 
business ventures.277 Conditions of employment for enlisted personnel are comparatively 
poor, with reports of soldiers having to purchase their own uniforms and equipment, and not 
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being remunerated sufficiently to feed their families.278 As a result of austere conditions, it is 
safe to say that enlisted personnel may be pressured into more coercive and corrupt means 
of generating income. A 2015 Environmental Investigation Agency report noted how Chinese 
nationals, illegally conducting logging in Myanmar, are sometimes captured by Tatmadaw 
personnel and released only after their Chinese employer pays upwards of USD$7,800.279 It 
is impossible to fully understand the extent of corruption in Myanmar, but it is suffice to say 
that the country is consistently ranked as one of the most corrupt countries in the world by 
international watchdogs such as Transparency International.280  
The ability of a military to raise off budget funds may provide it options to use those 
funds how it sees fit. This creates a capacity to bring about political ends that it would 
otherwise not be able to control through the central government’s budget. Although, the 
Tatmadaw does have significant economic holdings and control over some of the natural 
resources of the state, it is difficult to deduce how it would increase its political influence as a 
result of its corporate interests; this is simply because the Tatmadaw already dominates the 
political structure. How could the Tatmadaw actually gain more influence if it is already by far 
the most dominating political institution?  
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PART TWO: ASSESSMENT - THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF THE TATMADAW IN A 
DEMOCRATIC MYANMAR 
 
“As we mature in democracy in our country, the role of the military 
 in parliament will reduce gradually.”281 
President Thein Sein, 2015 
 
Unlike the second part on Indonesia, this section can not describe the current-state 
of the military’s political influence in a democratic Myanmar. The reason why is quite simple; 
Myanmar is yet to realise democracy. So-called ‘Burma Watches’ agree that although 
Myanmar has come a long way since 2011, when the junta established a new quasi-civilian 
government, reform has largely stagnated. Andrew Selth illustrates this point with his review 
of the 2015 Myanmar/Burma Update, a regular Australian National University conference on 
Burmese studies; “most speakers at the ANU conference presented sobering accounts of 
the obstacles facing democratisation in Burma and the likely pace of reform over the next 
few years."282  
As these actions and decisions are yet to be made, there is a requirement for future 
assessments to be produced. It should be stressed that there are major limits to futurist 
thinking. This section will use the findings of this paper to produce assessments on the 
Tatmadaw’s political influence in a future democratic Myanmar. It is impossible for any future 
assessment to be fully accurate. This is because there are so many variables and conditions 
that are yet to be fully realised or understood, while many decisions have not yet been 
made. However, quality assessments of likely and unlikely courses of action can be 
produced with knowledge of historical and contemporary issues based around a structured 
analytical framework. Unlike other sections, this assessment will employ an analytical 
framework referred to as the cone of plausibility. 
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The cone of plausibility is an analytical method of plotting future plausible scenarios 
of a given issue or topic in a logical manner.283 As this paper has three main CMR themes, 
three cones have been produced to assist in producing overall indicators of the future of 
Myanmar’s civil-military dynamic (See Annexes one through three). Each cone produces 
three plausible scenarios for the given theme; providing a most likely course of action 
(Baseline Scenario), a secondary likely course of action (Alternative Scenario) and a third 
plausible but unlikely scenario (Wildcard Scenario). The first step in producing a cone is 
anchoring the scenarios with a date in the future. After the date has been decided, drivers 
that assist in explaining the theme are brainstormed with knowledge of the subject. Once all 
the drivers have been listed, plausible judgements, referred to as assumptions, are made for 
each theme. The culminating effect of the assumptions produces the Baseline Scenario. To 
make the Alternative Scenario, the assumption that is judged most likely to change in the 
given timeframe is altered, changing the Baseline Scenario. To make the Wildcard Scenario, 
the assumption that is judged the least likely to change is altered, again providing a different 
course of action. To help visualise the cone of plausibility methodology, review annexes one 
through three.  
Given Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution states that elections take place every five years, 
and elections are to be conducted in November 2015, this section employs the future date of 
2021 to anchor all assessed courses of action to the same timeframe. Analysis of 
Myanmar’s experience in part one of this chapter produces the raw drivers for each of the 
three cones. Each assumption provides the most likely development of the respective driver 
given knowledge of contemporary and historical issues of the theme, coupled with a limited 
cultural understanding of the chaotic plethora of Burmese cultures. For the purposes of 
analytical credibility, this section accepts that certain conscious and unconscious 
assumptions have been made. These include but are not limited to the following; 
 Free and fair elections will be conducted in November 2015.  
 The NLD will win the 2015 elections but ASSK will not become president. 
 The Tatmadaw will not conduct a coup immediately after the November 2015 elections. 
 The constitution will remain largely intact, resulting in strong Tatmadaw representation in 
the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. 
 Foreign intervention into Myanmar is unlikely. 
 Internal conflict will remain a serious issue. 
 No major civil backlash will occur as a result of the fact that ASSK can not become 
president. 
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As well as assumptions, it should be emphasised that certain biases and predispositions 
have effected the following assessments. The most obvious bias made is referred to as 
‘mirror-imaging’ which is a natural tendency to underestimate the differences between one’s 
culture and the society with which is being analysed. This is important because the author of 
this paper was raised in a Western democracy and has a number of predispositions toward 
emotive concepts such as human rights, law, freedom, conflict, religion, justice and 
democracy; concepts that may be perceived very differently in Burmese culture. 
 
THE WEAKNESS OF CIVILIAN INSTITUTIONS AND THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE 
TATMADAW IN POLITICS IN A DEMOCRATIC MYANMAR 
This section provides three plausible assessments on the weakness of civilian 
institutions and the involvement of the Tatmadaw in politics in a future democratic Myanmar. 
Following is a table that represents the baseline drivers and assumptions;  
TABLE 2: Drivers and Assumptions – The Weakness of Civilian Institutions and the 
Involvement of the Tatmadaw in Politics in a Democratic Myanmar  
DRIVERS ASSUMPTIONS  
Civilian Leaders 
and Institutions  
Civilian leaders and institutions will struggle in the early years of democratic 
transition as a result of the inherent weakness of young and underdeveloped 
institutions which are for the most part still finding their feet. 
Retired 
Tatmadaw 
Officers  
As a result of their management experience, retired Tatmadaw officers will 
remain influential, including in parliament where they will continue to take up 
various leadership roles, such as speakerships. 
Parliamentary 
Representation 
and the 2008 
Constitution  
The 2008 Constitution will remain largely unchanged. Minor changes will see the 
Tatmadaw lose a small portion of their share (25 percent) of the seats in the 
Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. The military will not allow ASSK to become president.  
 
 
Tatmadaw 
Leadership’s view 
of Democracy   
The Tatmadaw’s leadership want democracy to flourish. However, the military 
only cede control of the country on their own terms. One of the main terms will be 
the protection of the leadership’s private interests. As such, civilian leaders will 
have to compromise with the Tatmadaw, providing the military with concessions; 
military leaders involved in past human rights abuses will not be brought to justice 
while their accumulated wealth will largely be untouched. 
Internal Conflict 
and the 
Tatmadaw’s 
Although the democratically elected government will push for the peaceful 
resolution of the various civil wars with Myanmar’s ethnic based groups, armed 
conflict will remain a serious issue in the country. As a result, the Tatmadaw will 
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Stabilising Effect remain internally focused and will retain a strong raison d’être, providing a 
justification for it’s self-perception as a sole protector of the Three Main National 
Causes.  
 
BASELINE SCENARIO – COURSE OF ACTION ONE 
The culminating effect of the six baseline assumptions is that; Tatmadaw’s leadership 
accepts democratic transition albeit only on its own terms. As such, civilian leaders, who 
remain relatively weak, compromise with the Tatmadaw. One of the main terms is that the 
private interests of Tatmadaw leaders are protected; military leaders involved in human 
rights abuses are not prosecuted while their accumulated wealth is protected. The 
Tatmadaw retains a limited share of seats in the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. The USDP also loses 
seats in parliament. Although the democratically elected government pushes for the peaceful 
resolution of the various internal conflicts between the central government and ethnic based 
groups, civil war remains a serious issue in Myanmar. As a result, the Tatmadaw will remain 
internally focused and will retain a strong raison d’être, providing a justification for it’s self-
perception as a sole protector of the Three Main National Causes. The Tatmadaw continue 
to hold significant political clout but accept civilian democracy on their own terms. 
ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO – COURSE OF ACTION TWO 
 The most likely assumption to change is; the Tatmadaw Leadership’s view of 
Democracy.  This is because with the increased international and domestic pressure, the 
Tatmadaw is likely to make at least limited concessions to civilian leaders by 2021. The 
changed assumption is that; although the Tatmadaw still want democracy, they are not yet 
willing to cede control to civilian elected leaders. This produces the following assessment; 
Tatmadaw’s leadership refuse democratic transition. The Tatmadaw retains 25 percent of 
the seats in the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. Even though civilian parties have a majority of the 
parliament, the veto available to the Tatmadaw, stagnates political reform. Although the 
democratically elected government push for the peaceful resolution of the various internal 
conflicts between the central government and ethnic based groups, civil war remains a 
serious issue in Myanmar. As a result, the Tatmadaw will remain internally focused and will 
retain a strong raison d’être, providing a justification for it’s self-perception as a sole 
protector of the Three Main National Causes. The Tatmadaw continues to be the most 
politically influential actor in Myanmar. 
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WILDCARD – COURSE OF ACTION THREE 
 The least likely assumption to change is; Internal Conflict and the Tatmadaw’s 
Stabilising Effect. Internal conflict between ethnic groups has been commonplace in 
Myanmar throughout its history. Although there have been recent ceasefire treaties agreed 
to, the dominance of the Bamar in the NLD and the Tatmadaw, as well as other institutions, 
is a core reason why internal conflict remains a serious issue in Myanmar. The changed 
assessment is that; civilian parties agree with most ethnic based groups to cease conflict 
which changes the perception of the Tatmadaw. The Three Main National Causes are no 
longer so important. This produces the following assessment; 
The Tatmadaw accept democracy under its own terms but retain a limited share of seats in 
the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. Civilian leaders, who remain relatively weak, compromise with the 
Tatmadaw. One of the main terms is that the private interests of Tatmadaw leaders are 
protected; military leaders involved in human rights abuses are not prosecuted while their 
accumulated wealth is protected. The USDP also lose seats in parliament. The 
democratically elected government pushes for the peaceful resolution of the various internal 
conflicts which produces the desired outcome; most ethnic groups agree to a cessation of 
hostiles. As a result, the Tatmadaw loses its a strong raison d’être, significantly downgrading 
its justification for its own self-perception as a sole protector of the Three Main National 
Causes. The Tatmadaw continue to hold political clout but accept civilian democracy on their 
terms. The military lose influence. 
CONCLUSION 
These three assessed scenarios illustrate one major point; the Tatmadaw has the 
power to decide whether or not Myanmar will become a democracy; civilians have little say. 
The real power is with the Tatmadaw’s leadership. It was assessed that they would only 
cede control of the country to democratically elected civilians under their own conditions. It is 
very likely that the Tatmadaw will retain significant influence in the democratic era, especially 
in the first years while civilian institutions remain underdeveloped.  
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THE INTERNAL SECURITY FOCUS OF THE TATMADAW 
This section provides three plausible scenarios on the internal security focus of the 
Tatmadaw in a future democratic Myanmar and its effect on the military’s political influence. 
Following is a table that represents the baseline drivers and assumptions;  
TABLE 3: Drivers and Assumptions – The Internal Security Focus of the Tatmadaw in a 
Democratic Myanmar  
DRIVERS ASSUMPTIONS  
Diversity of Myanmar and 
the dominance of the 
Bamar 
Myanmar obviously continues to be an ethnographically complex 
country. The Bamar continue to dominate Burmese society, 
perpetuating issues with other ethnic groups.  
Buddism  Buddhist groups continue to back civilian political leaders and lead 
protests against the military’s political role.  
Tatmadaw’s Reliance on 
Coercion  
In the face of heavy domestic and international criticism, the Tatmadaw 
slightly reduce their heavy reliance on coercion to deal with ethnic 
groups and protestors. However, the military still conduct enemy-centric 
counterinsurgency operations against the ethnic based groups which 
sees various human rights abuses committed. 
Internal vs. External Focus 
of the Tatmadaw 
The Tatmadaw will become more focused on external defence than it 
was in the past. This is a result of the changing geopolitical 
environment in the Indo-Pacific region. Myanmar will seek to have close 
relations with most regional countries, including China and the U.S. The 
Tatmadaw will still focus most of its attention on internal security.   
Ceasefire Agreements and 
Subsequent Cessation of 
Hostilities  
Naypyidaw does not successfully complete signing ceasefire 
agreements with all ethnic groups which sees a continuation of conflict.  
 
BASELINE SCENARIO – COURSE OF ACTION ONE  
The culminating effect of the six baseline assumptions is that; the central government 
fails to agree with all ethnic groups on the caseation of hostiles throughout the country. This 
sees the perpetuation of the Tatmadaw’s focus on internal security; however, due to 
increasing interest from international actors, as well as the speed with which information is 
now disseminated, the Tatmadaw reduce their level of violence. Political protests continue in 
the major urban areas, at times instigated by Buddist groups wishing to bring about change. 
Human rights abuses still occur but on a reduced scale and intensity. The Tatmadaw begin 
to focus more attention and resources to external defence, and the capabilities required for 
such operations, such as naval and air assets. The military continue to derive political 
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influence from their involvement in internal security as they remain the sole national 
organisation capable of physically bringing about political change at the national level.   
ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO – COURSE OF ACTION TWO  
 The most likely assumption to change is; the ceasefire agreements and subsequent 
cessation of hostiles. This is only the most likely as a process of elimination; it is very difficult 
to see how the other assumptions made are likely. The changed assumption is that;  
The central government, through concessions, manage to agree to a caseation of all 
hostilities with ethnic based groups. This has the effect of representing the aspirations of the 
non-Bamar minorities, ceding some control of certain areas, similar to the way Aceh 
Province is administered in Indonesia. This has greatly reduced the requirement to have an 
internally focused military. This reduces the political clout of the military as they are no 
longer required on such a scale as they were earlier.  
 
‘WILDCARD’ – COURSE OF ACTION THREE 
  The least likely assumption to change is; Buddhist groups continue to back civilian 
political leaders and lead protests against the military’s political role. This is the most unlikely 
as the Buddhists have remained firmly anti-junta for the past 50 years. Their belief in non-
violent political change is also in line with the country’s most popular civilian party, the NLD. 
The changed assumption is; As a result of the religious leaders quest for stability, Buddhist 
groups back the military in retaining a strong political orientation. This produces the following 
assessment; 
The central government fail to sign peace agreements with all ethnic based groups. Buddhist 
groups back the military’s strong political orientation which results in much of the Bamar 
population rallying behind the military in the fight against the disparate ethnic based groups. 
This sees the Tatmadaw focusing on areas with large Muslim concentrations, such as 
Rakhine State. The military’s level of brutality increases as a result of their domestic 
acceptance. The military remain deployed throughout the country. Their level of political 
influence increases as the civilian government now requires the military to be engaged 
across the country. Economic sanctions from Western countries are again placed on 
Myanmar.  
CONCLUSION 
It is difficult to imagine a Myanmar without ethnic based groups and the continuation 
of violence. The central government will have to make concessions to groups that remain 
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unwilling to cease hostilities. Buddhist groups will likely remain influential. Violence will likely 
continue in the northern and western states, including Rakhine, Kachin and Shan. As a 
result of the continuation of violence, the Tatmadaw will likely remain critical to the central 
government’s cause and thus influential.  
 
THE TATMADAW’S CORPORATE INTERESTS  
This section seeks to assess the possibility of the Tatmadaw gaining or losing 
political influence in a future democratic Myanmar as a result of its corporate interests. 
Following is a table that represents the assessed baseline drivers and assumptions for this 
topic;  
TABLE 4: Drivers and Assumptions – The Weakness of Civilian Institutions and the 
Involvement of the Tatmadaw in Politics in a Democratic Myanmar  
 
DRIVERS ASSUMPTIONS  
The Civil-Military 
Relationship 
 
The Tatmadaw will accept the democratically elected civilian 
government and thus accept civilian control of the military. However, 
the military will still hold politician clout with a reduced amount of seats 
in parliament, down from 25 percent. The USDP will also have far less 
seats in both the upper and lower houses of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw.  
The Defence Budget 
 
The defence budget will remain relatively high at between 10 percent 
and 14.4 percent. Much of the budget will be spent modernising the 
Tatmadaw’s capabilities. 
Corruption 
 
Corruption will remain rife within Burmese culture, providing Tatmadaw 
commanders access to an alternate funding stream.   
Economic Development 
 
Myanmar’s economy will continue to grow exponentially providing a 
much larger total government budget to the civilian government. As 
such, the government can provide the military with an increased total 
budget, even if the proportion reduces from around 14 percent to 
around 10 percent.  
Solider Welfare/Unit 
Requirements 
 
Individual units, particularly in remote border regions, will maintain 
enterprises to supplement their portion of the central government’s 
defence budget. 
Military’s Business 
Interests.  
 
The military’s foundations (UMEHL and MEC) will struggle to cope with 
the very different political conditions of the democratic era while many 
other actors vye for the same resources.  
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BASELINE SCENARIO – COURSE OF ACTION ONE  
The culminating effect of the six baseline assumptions is that; the Tatmadaw accepts 
civilian hegemony while maintaining a reduced political capacity. The military receives a 
reduced percentage of the total budget. However, because the total amount of the budget 
has significantly increased, the Tatmadaw end up with an overall increased total amount. 
The military’s business ventures struggle to cope with the onset of economic development, 
which has seen international interest in Myanmar increase exponentially. Individual military 
units continue to produce modest supplementary income for the benefit of members, namely 
their elite. Corruption provides the most obvious means with which these individual units can 
procure additional income. 
ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO – COURSE OF ACTION TWO  
 It is most likely that the assessed defence budget will change before any of the other 
assumptions. Therefore, the altered assumption is that; the Tatmadaw’s budget is 
significantly decreased to below five percent of the total government budget. Therefore, the 
alternative scenario is that;  
Although the Tatmadaw accepts civilian control of the military, it intensifies it’s legal and 
illegal business ventures to produce an increased budget. As the military’s legitimate 
business ventures struggle to cope with the onset of economic development, the most 
obvious means with which the Tatmadaw can produce significant off-budget funds is 
exploitation of the mineral and forestry resources in the central and frontier regions. 
Corruption provides another obvious means with which individual units can procure 
additional modest income. The Tatmadaw increases its political influence as a result of a 
renewed economic focus which provides it with increased financial independence of the 
central government.  
‘WILDCARD’ – COURSE OF ACTION THREE 
 It was found that the least likely assumption to change was Myanmar’s GDP growth 
forecast, which is set to grow from USD$64.33 billion in 2015 to USD$95.96 billion by 
2020.284 The altered assumption is that Myanmar’s GDP stagnates and recedes well below 
USD$64.33 billion per annum. The wildcard scenario is that: 
The Tatmadaw declines elected civilian governance and implants itself as a caretaker 
government while it intensifies its economic enterprises, nationalising various industries. This 
sees a dramatic shift in Myanmar’s foreign policy as Western sanctions intensify. This 
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pushes Myanmar closer to China, Russia and other non-Western powerbrokers. In this 
scenario, the Tatmadaw gains political influence because it becomes the governing 
institution, not because of corporate interest but because of brute force. 
CONCLUSION 
In the pre-democratic analysis of this topic, it was difficult to understand how the 
most politically influential organisation in the country could possibly acquire more influence 
through its corporate interests. This is because of the way political influence is derived from 
the corporate sector; financial independence increases the political influence of the military 
and limits the ability of the central government to oversee the military’s activities. Having the 
ability to fund initiatives that the civilian government has not budgeted for, allows the military 
to bypass civilian policy processes and make decisions that may run counter to the interests 
of the government.285 The most plausible future scenario found that even with a seriously 
reduced level of involvement in the economic sector, it is plausible that the Tatmadaw will 
retain some influence as a result of its likely perpetuation of certain economic endeavours. 
This is because the military will no longer be the most powerful political actor, but 
subordinate to the civilian government. 
CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER THREE 
Part one of this chapter sought to understand the extent of the Tatmadaw’s political 
influence.  The first section illustrated how the Tatmadaw became involved in politics in the 
first place and how it rose to become the most dominant actor in Myanmar. Although recent 
reforms are viewed positively, it should be remembered that running up to the November 
2015 elections, the Tatmadaw is the most politically influential actor in Myanmar, with a 
significant share (25 percent) of the seats in the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, and a dominant role in 
the governance of the ruling party, the USDP. The seats in the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw give the 
Tatmadaw an effective veto over other political actors, as a result of their strong standing in 
the 2008 Constitution which states that 75 percent of the Pyithu Hluttaw must agree to any 
constitutional change. Although the NLD is the most dominant party in Myanmar, it remains 
institutionally weak as a result of it having all of its leadership eggs (ASSK) in one basket.286 
The second section showed how over the past five decades the Tatmadaw has ruled over 
Myanmar and been the most politically influential force in the country largely as a result of its 
capability to conduct violence. As a result of its overreliance on coercion, the Tatmadaw has 
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arguably lost much of its domestic legitimacy and credibility as a so-called patriotic 
institution, a concept it regards as important.287 The Tatmadaw have created a paradox in 
that it can only safeguard the nation by harassment and coercion of the population.288 The 
third section showed that as the most dominant political entity in Myanmar, it is somewhat 
difficult to understand how the Tatmadaw could garnish more political clout as a result of its 
corporate interests. The culminating effect of this part is that without the military’s approval to 
change the constitution, Myanmar will remain a military-run state. Civilians have very little 
say in the matter. 
The second part of this chapter noted that because Myanmar is yet to relaise 
democracy, future judgements were required to answer the Myanmar ‘part’ of the core 
question of this paper. This part used an analytical method refereed to as the cone of 
plausibility to help shed light on plausible scenarios. From the scenarios generated certain 
themes emerged. Informed judgements can be made from these themes. The first section 
reinforced the findings from the previous section, noting that the Tatmadaw has the power to 
decide whether or not Myanmar will become a democracy; civilians have little say. The real 
power is with the Tatmadaw’s leadership. It was assessed that they would only cede control 
of the country to democratically elected civilians under their own conditions. The Tatmadaw 
is unlikely to cede all of its seats in the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw by 2021. It is very likely that the 
Tatmadaw will retain significant influence in the democratic era, especially in the first years 
while civilian institutions remain underdeveloped. The second section found that for the 
Tatmadaw to lose its strong internal security focus, any democratic government would have 
to peacefully conclude the majority of armed conflicts throughout the country. This can only 
occur when the government accepts that certain concessions will have to be provided to the 
ethnic groups in order to halt the fighting. Due to the likelihood in the continuation of 
violence, the Tatmadaw will also remain critical to the central government’s cause and thus 
influential. The third section of this part showed that in a democratic Myanmar, the 
Tatmadaw may in fact derive influence from its corporate interests. This was difficult to 
realise in the pre-democratic era as the Tatmadaw was already the most politically influential 
actor in the country and could not acquire more influence. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has sought to answer the following question; to what extent has the TNI 
lost political influence in the democratic era and are similar developments likely for 
Myanmar’s Tatmadaw? Chapter one reviewed literature on the theories of influence, 
democracy and CMR, focusing on Southeast Asian approaches. This chapter produced a 
framework that was used for further analysis on Indonesia and Myanmar. The framework 
was made up of three key arguments, which were originally presented by Alagappa and 
Mietzner, that help explain the political influence of the military. The framework’s first point 
argued the most important way militaries can gain influence is by becoming involved in the 
political institutions of the state, while civilians remain weak. The second part of the 
framework was derived from Alagappa’s core thesis argument on the utility of coercion in 
governance. This states that, although coercion and domestic political legitimacy are 
negatively related, coercion does make a military influential as it is able to forcefully bring 
about political ends. The last part of the framework noted that the military will likely assume a 
greater role in the corporate world if its governance role is expanded, which subsequently 
expands the political influence of the military further. By having its own income sources, the 
military can limit the oversight and influence that a civilian government has over it, increasing 
the military’s autonomy as a political actor.  
Chapter two focused on the Indonesian experience and concluded that although the 
TNI has lost significant political influence in the democratic era, it remains politically 
orientated. A comparison between the pre-democracy and democratic periods found that the 
TNI was historically the most politically influential actor in Indonesian politics. In the 
democratic era, however, this has changed significantly with the military no longer as 
influential as it once was. This loss of influence is visible in that the TNI no longer have seats 
in the MPR, nor does it have official links with any party, factors which directly limits its ability 
to bring about political change. The TNI’s self-induced ‘New Paradigm’, an aspect of 
reformasi, also split the military and the police and shelved the dwi-fungsi doctrine, reform 
measures that are in line with democratic CMR. However, the TNI seems to be interested in 
retaining a strong internal role, jostling with the newly-formed POLRI for primacy of the 
internal security domain. This has seen the TNI and POLRI compete for the country’s high 
profile counterterrorism job. For Indonesia to consolidate as a democracy, it must find ways 
to limit the TNI’s internal security role. The military may continue to have a small part to play 
in internal security, especially in the higher end of the threat spectrum, but there is a very 
fine line. The TNI’s retention of the TCS and its ability to project force internally still provides 
the military influence throughout the country. The TNI’s corporate interests have been hit 
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hard by democratic transition, which has seen very different economic conditions eventuate. 
In the pre-democratic period, the TNI was given nearly unlimited access to the riches of the 
state. In the democratic era, the TNI is merely one of many actors trying to profit from the 
mineral rich country. The TNI’s modest ability to create off-budget funds enables a level of 
autonomy from central government. This was even the case during the New Order, when the 
TNI and Suharto were in close association. It was found that in 2010 a major-Western 
mining consortium paid the TNI and POLRI approximately USD$14 million for security of 
sites in Irian Jaya. Does this money go into the state coffers or into the (big) pockets of local 
TNI commanders? This is difficult to assess. The fact is, in the democratic era, the TNI is still 
engaged in profiteering which provides it autonomy from the central government, which is 
inherently undemocratic.  
Chapter three found that Myanmar and Indonesia do have CMR traits in common, 
including the militaries dominant role since independence in the 1940s. The first part of the 
chapter on Myanmar discussed the rise of the military’s political role since independence 
until immediately prior to the 2015 election. This part found that the Tatmadaw effectively 
became the government in 1958 and largely retained that role until 2011 when the current 
quasi-civilian government was established. The Tatmadaw’s internal security focus, which 
has seen a heavy-handed approach involving various human rights violations, resulting in 
the Tatmadaw’s own legitimacy and credibility as a self-perceived patriotic institution 
compromised.289 This has changed the way much of the population view the military, 
including the majority Bamar.290 The current quasi-civilian government is dominated by 
retired and current serving military personnel. As well as dominating the ruling party, the 
USDP, the Tatmadaw has 25 percent of the seats in the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. The military 
has engineered its longevity through the 2008 Constitution, which states that any 
constitutional change require 75 percent of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw to concur, something 
nearly impossible without the approval of the Tatmadaw; this gives the military a veto option. 
The second part of the chapter on Myanmar sought to produce insights into the likely 
political influence of the Tatmadaw in a future democratic Myanmar. The cone of plausibility 
was used to produce scenarios that insights could be extracted from. This method assessed 
that the Tatmadaw is likely to remain politically influential in a future democratic Myanmar, 
similar to the way the TNI has positioned itself in post-Suharto Indonesia. The weakness of 
civilian institutions will remain for years to come in Myanmar. This will likely include the NLD, 
which as of 2015, has a weak institutional structure as a result of having all of its leadership 
eggs in one basket, ASSK. Being the main political party challenging the Tatmadaw’s 
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continued dominance; the NLD will require a diversification of its leadership if it is serious 
about replacing the quasi-civilian government in the coming years. Even in a democratic 
Myanmar, it is unlikely the Tatmadaw will give up its entire seating arrangement in the 
Pyidaungsu Hluttaw. Again, this will ensure a continuation of direct influence in parliament. 
Armed conflict is likely to remain a serious issue for Myanmar which is also likely to see the 
Tatmadaw remain politically influential as it will remain critical to the central government’s 
causes. The Tatmadaw’s corporate interests may provide it influence in a future democracy 
as profits will enable the military to fund their own initiatives. It was impossible to realise how 
this could occur in pre-democratic Myanmar as the military was already the most influential 
organisation. This paper has shown that the Tatmadaw will very likely remain politically 
motivated and politically orientated in a future democratic Myanmar, much like the TNI has. It 
should be reemphasised that assessments made herein are just that; assessments. Only 
time will tell how the Tatmadaw will react to democratic transition. 
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